German Military at the start of WWII

[ubermensche]

During the Battle of France, the Luftwaffe was one of the most technological advanced air forces in the world, with over 3000 metal aircraft. They rapidly achieved air superiority over France.

[muck]

The German successes at the beginning of World War Two were based on innovative allocation of tasks and responsibilities among all ranks, on tactical prowess and the foresightful "circumnavigation" of the own inherent shortcomings. The German equipment was not superior and the items that could've meant superiority were spread too thin over the forces. Had the allies adapted their own tactics to meet the German challenge - such as the emphasis on armoured spearheads in accordance to the Guderian doctrine - the Nazis would've been screwed quickly.

[Bloo]

An Old book I had as a kid )Strategy and Tactics: Tank Warfare) has a good rundown of German Armor at the very start of the war

Of the roughly 3,000 tanks in the German army 2,190 were obsolete Panzer I and II’s which were lightly armored, slow, and armed only with light weapons. 878 were good but untested Panzer III’s and a model that the Germans stole from the Czechoslovakians, the 38t. The rest were the excellent Panzer IV, but were severely lacking in numbers.

Their armor capability was poor (though their tactics weren't) and they were hardly motorized. Quality of aircraft and AT was another story though. Plus the Allies proved to be their own worst enemies in much of the early war.

[TheKiwi]

During the Battle of France, the Luftwaffe was one of the most technological advanced air forces in the world, with over 3000 metal aircraft. They rapidly achieved air superiority over France.

The RAF and French Air Force in France at the time were also equipped with many modern aircraft. The issue again was that the Luftwaffe's tactics were better than those of the allies. Fighters weren't distributed evenly over the front, but concentrated to acheive air superiority where it was needed. In addition, the German army was heavily equipped with AA which made the low level attacks used by allied bombers very costly.

Even so, the Battle for France was very costly for the Luftwaffe. I'll look up the figures of just what was lost when I get home, but it certainly had an effect on the subsequent Battle of Britain.

[LineDoggie]

The 37mm "Army Door Knocking Device" was pretty much standard in 1939.
It was just overtaken by technology but in 1939 it could still knock out anything short of the few french heavy tanks.
In fact it was a export success. The Japanese, the US and I think the USSR all bought this gun.
The US 37mm AT gun successfully used in the Pacific is the same weapon.

Umm no it isnt
Pak 36 37X249R US M3 37X223R Differing Muzzle velocity, effective ranges, differing mounts, breechblocks.....

US purchased 2 Pak 36 for study but did not use the cartridge or design. nothing was interchangeable

[ubermensche]

The German successes at the beginning of World War Two were based on innovative allocation of tasks and responsibilities among all ranks, on tactical prowess and the foresightful "circumnavigation" of the own inherent shortcomings. The German equipment was not superior and the items that could've meant superiority were spread too thin over the forces. Had the allies adapted their own tactics to meet the German challenge - such as the emphasis on armoured spearheads in accordance to the Guderian doctrine - the Nazis would've been screwed quickly.

Agreed. Overall, after WW2, Germany put considerable amount of effort into innovating their military compared to the UK and France. Since the Versailles Treaty only allowed 4000 officers in its military, the Reichswehr privileged the experienced veterans of the frontlines while the "traditional" military lost its place due to the great defeat. The new German army emphasized on personal innovation among officers and NCOs, if they saw an opportunity, they must exploit it (as opposed to the French, who thought to control everything within a plan). On the other hand, UK was largely traumatized by the war and tried to avoid war by any means possible, so military financing was slashed. France prioritized limiting their casualties and thought that fortified defensive positions were the best way of doing so, hence the Maginot Line.

As for armoured warfare, the British military high command was largely unimpressed by the capabilities of the tank, despite the obvious strengths that it showed during the exercises on the Salisbury Plains. France developped very capable tanks but failed to use them at their full potential, since they were mainly employed in a defensive, while tanks were from the start intended to be used in an offensive breakthrough role. I recommend Military Innovation in the Interwar Period by Williamson R. Murray and Allan R. Millett. The 1st chapter is dedicated to armour.

I'll be writing a 4000 word extended essay on the development of armoured warfare throughout WW2 for the end of my 2-year International Baccalaureate program.

[stonecutter]

The RAF and French Air Force in France at the time were also equipped with many modern aircraft....
Even so, the Battle for France was very costly for the Luftwaffe. I'll look up the figures of just what was lost when I get home, but it certainly had an effect on the subsequent Battle of Britain.

France only had a few D.520s in frontline service at the time of the invasion, the rest were obsolete pieces of junk (Blochs) which, in the hands of capable pilots, still managed to inflict some damage. It's sad to think that with France's aviation record (best fighters produced in WWI, highest scoring Allied fighter ace in WWI), she let her air force technology and doctrine go by the wayside in the interwar years, with disasterous results.

One can only imagine what would have happened if De Gaulle had been in charge in the 1930s. Instead, for his progressive (unorthodox) views, he was punished and kept out of the decision-making loop by higher-ups, notably Petain. This was, after all, the man who first outlined Blitzkrieg warfare in his 1934 book, The Army of the Future; if he had had his way, the French First Army of 1944 would have been the French Army of 1940, and the Germans would have faced a whole different adversary.

[James]

While they were victorious in Poland, the Heer was pretty seriously mauled; estimates for German casualties range from about 40,000 to 55,000 for the campaign. I can't remember the source at the moment, but I want to say that I read somewhere that refitting and re-equipping the Heer after Poland was a big enough task that it altered the OKW's timeline for operations in the west.

[PostmandPer]

While they were victorious in Poland, the Heer was pretty seriously mauled; estimates for German casualties range from about 40,000 to 55,000 for the campaign. I can't remember the source at the moment, but I want to say that I read somewhere that refitting and re-equipping the Heer after Poland was a big enough task that it altered the OKW's timeline for operations in the west.

I find it hard to believe that it wouldnt, invading a big country like Poland shouldnt be an easy task.

[Mordoror]

I've heard that Germans weren't as technologically advanced militarily as other countries before the start of the war. Which countries were more advanced, and generally what was the state of the Wehrmacht during 1939?

I ll go outside the technical issues (that are largely already discussed) and say that the Versaille treaty army authorized to Germany after WWI was kinda in fact a blessing that helped a lot in the initial successes of the Whermacht in 39 and 40 (yes i know it is a bit counter intuitive).
Why ?
Because it was kinda a cadre army (100 000 men) with a high proportion of seasoned officers and seasoned soldiers all professionals.

With such a low number authorized, recruiting pool was large enough to choose the best of recruits, increasing the overal human quality (something very important that you can't achieve in large draft armies that had all sort of soldiers)

Because it had already a large proportion of seasoned soldiers they acted mainly as NCO for the new recruits, continuing and expanding the concepts of "decisions and initiative at low level". Something you barely had in others armies, too much higher levels centered and too centralized

Because it was scrapped of all of its main heavy weapons, German army had to start from scratches but didn't had to carry the burden of outdated weapons when things got hot (French, UK and Russian armies had tanks, planes and guns as old as WWI, they were basically targets on the battlefield and performed generally not too well anymore)

Because the German army couldn't rely on a large army number they had too set up (in the continuity of the Sturmtruppen units of the WWI) tactics to concentrate their firepower and learn to achieve local parity or even local superiority, leading to the concentration of tanks and planes that are the basis of the Blietzkrieg

Finally being a cadre army it allowed Germany to experiment new concepts that couldn't take roots in others armies, too sclerotic because of traditions and the ideas that what achievd victory in 1918 would be still efficient 20 years later.

All that gave the 1938-1939 Heer and Luftwaffe

[ubermensche]

^Not to mention that traditionalists fell out of favour in Germany after WW1 while they still had an important role to play.

I find it hard to believe that it wouldnt, invading a big country like Poland shouldnt be an easy task.

I actually find it surprising that the Wehrmacht suffered such high casualties in Poland. The common perception was that the Germans went through Poland like hot knife through butter.

[Kitsune]

I ll go outside the technical issues (that are largely already discussed) and say that the Versaille treaty army authorized to Germany after WWI was kinda in fact a blessing that helped a lot in the initial successes of the Whermacht in 39 and 40 (yes i know it is a bit counter intuitive). [...]

No it's not counterintuitive - this is essentially the classic, old explanation. The story goes usually like this: "The Germans (militaristic as they are) trained all the time between the world wars while the French and British (peaceful, fluffy, harmless, nice, generally well-meaning, you know them) did not because they were having second thoughts, wrestling with their consciousness, or because they were traumatized due to the world war. And when the second big war started the Germans had all this new brandnew stuff while the poor French and British had to fight with their outdated WWI equipment. Besides, the Germans knew exactly when WWII would begin because they started it themselves. They had all worked it out before...they had lots of experience, too, with those four or five wars of aggression that they had started over the last 75 years...)

Even today you still find historians that promote this view of things. The problem is only that it is utterly and totally wrong. The Germans were at least as traumatized by WWI as the French or British were, if not more (after all, they had lost the Great War and the Versailles Treaty had been imposed on them by France and Britain, not the other way around). Nor was it the case that France or Britain had stopped military development or modernization of their armed forces - they did not possess only WWI stuff at thend of the 30ts. They had modern military forces, with soldiers, more tanks, considerably more guns and an altogether higher degree of motorization than the Germans. And especially France had had the chance to militarily train its young men in every year since the Great War while Germany could not do this up to 1935.

The situation in 1939 was therefore one of a very hastily raised German military, which was numerically inferior to the French armed forces alone, which also had less eqipment and whose personnel was generally inexperienced if not downright green. So ill prepared was the Wehrmacht for any protracted warfare, that the German ammunition stocks were all but empty when the fighting in Poland ended in October 1939. As far as the OKW's timeline for the West was concerned, which someone mentioned before - there hardly wasn't any to speak of. There had been no plan to attack France at all. The idea had been a defensive war in the west, and only when the German leadership came to believe that these plans had been compromised by Allied intelligence did they start to make new plans, which evolved to this extremely bold strategy to invade France.

In conclusion: the Versailles Treaty rendered Germany helpless and this was not an advantage (nor was it meant to be) but a severe disadvantage. One can tax one's brain about how victory can give rise to complacency in the victor while defeat may motivate the defeated, or perhaps that the poor man is actually richer than the rich man, because once he opens his empty hand he owns the whole world (or some other fortune cookie wisdom like that). But not to be allowed to have conscription, tanks, artillery, an Air Force, a real Navy (or a general staff, a real military intelligence branch...prohibitions that the Germans largely evaded) were limitations and not advantages. That the German military managed to overcome these restraints and turned things around the way it did was nothing short of surprising.

[JCR]

France only had a few D.520s in frontline service at the time of the invasion, the rest were obsolete pieces of junk (Blochs) which, in the hands of capable pilots, still managed to inflict some damage. It's sad to think that with France's aviation record (best fighters produced in WWI, highest scoring Allied fighter ace in WWI), she let her air force technology and doctrine go by the wayside in the interwar years, with disasterous results.

The French Air Force wasn't as badly equipped as it sounds.
Most of its fighters were on par with the Luftwaffe or only slightly inferior. Keep in mind that in 1939-40 the majority of the Luftwaffe was still equipped with the D model of the 109, which was about about as fast and powerful as a early Hurricane or a Curtiss Hawk 75.

In fact during the Phoney war, the Armee de l'Air usually came out on top or equal in losses in the Winter 1939 cross border skirmishes, in contrary to the early RAF squadrons who often were severly mauled by bouncing 109s.
Even the Morane 406s usually gave a good account of themselves.
The french pilots were good, but the french air force was ineffectively deployed.
The situation was not as good with bombers, though. The french were just reequipping with modern types in 1940.

[Mordoror]

The story goes usually like this: "The Germans (militaristic as they are) trained all the time between the world wars while the French and British (peaceful, fluffy, harmless, nice, generally well-meaning, you know them) did not because they were having second thoughts, wrestling with their consciousness,

That's a simplistic pov and not what i said. Although i agree that German military showed weaknesses due to the Versailles treaty (mainly in some areas that were long to rebuild like the Navy) you cannot deny that the way was formed the Treaty army helped to manage the future Heer i.e it functioned as cadre units given a high ratio level of NCOs and kriegspiel trained headquarter staff immediately available once the hostilities beginning. That's something that impacts directly on the efficiency of any army, more than the number or age of guns and tanks, both at squad/platoon level and regiment/division/army corps level.

[James]

I find it hard to believe that it wouldnt, invading a big country like Poland shouldnt be an easy task.

Most people believe the myth about Polish Horse cavalry charging German tanks and machine guns and think that the Polish were utterly defeated while the Germans only took a handful of casualties. The Poles fought hard.