Operation Anaconda - 10 years after

[The Dane]

Operation Anaconda: Lessons Learned, or Lessons Observed?

[QUOTE“. . . we weren‘t idiots, but we weren‘t asking the questions we needed to . . .‖

— Lieutenant General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, USA, 2004 ]

Originally planned as a three-day battle with light combat, Operation Anaconda turned out to be a seven-day battle with intense combat and was officially
terminated only after 17 days. Operation Anaconda, which lasted from March 2–
18, was successful because up to several hundred enemy fighters were killed and
the rest fled the Shahikot Valley, leaving it in the control of US and allied forces.
US casualties totaled eight military personnel killed and over 50 wounded. Success
was achieved because the US military showed a capacity to adapt by employing
joint operations and modern information networks to surmount a surprising and
difficult challenge

[/QUOTE]

ABSTRACT
Operation Anaconda, a subordinate operation to Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002, was notable for difficulties
in integrating US air and ground forces in order to bring combat power to bear on a stronger than originally
anticipated foe. In the seven years of study and debate since 2002, key players from both sides have for the most
part agreed that with better preliminary coordination, the operation could have been executed less risk to US and
coalition personnel. While many commentators have noted that suboptimal command and control relationships,
lack of communication, and confusion all contributed to the initial problems in air/ground coordination, few have
examined the joint and service doctrine from 2002 to determine to what degree it might have negatively influenced
the smooth planning and execution of the operation. This study seeks to determine if any inconsistencies or
omissions in joint and service doctrine may have contributed to the problems with air and ground integration
observed in Operation Anaconda, and also to determine if doctrinal updates since 2002 have adequately addressed
any systemic disconnects the study discovers. In any cases where modern doctrine still does not address the key
problems noted in Anaconda, the study will suggest modifications to doctrine which will increase the likelihood
that the key ―lessons observed‖ from the operation truly become ―lessons learned‖ in the institutional consciousnesses
of the ground and air components.

Report: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA502029

RIP to the dead..
R

[Bob the Builder on Crack]

Op Anaconda was definitely an interesting battle, thanks for sharing. Another good read about the battle is Not a Good Day to Die by Sean Naylor.