
Originally Posted by
Jacknola
Here are some points about Vietnam and McNamara, Johnson, Westmoreland, that should be considered.
- The American public did not abandon support for the Vietnam war, ever. The election of Nixon, twice, proves it. They did lose confidence in the conduct of the war and in its objectives. But when the war "heated up" in the early '60s, the public was all for intervention, "go anywhere, fight any battle... to ensure the survival and success... etc." A failure to intervene to prevent the fall of Vietnam to the communist invasion in 1964 would have defeated Johnson.
- McNamara and Johnson never remotely understood the purpose and means of warfare, which is to bend the enemy's leadership to your will. They simply could not understand why North Vietnam did not quit... "But it's in NVN's interest to stop.. they would be much better off and richer if they just quit doing that nasty invasion stuff..." Hence the lunacy of "rolling thunder," the white house picking individual bombing targets, "graduated response," etc.... which only allowed matching countermeasures instead of seeking an end by causing unbearable pain.
There is a corollary with Afghanistan.. in that the people "leading" the Taliban have been given no incentive to stop the war.. because they are not personally at risk. Indeed the Pakistani ISI and many general officers have been given monetary incentives to continue their proxy war, and thus continue their fantasy great game against the rest of the world. Until the "rain of stones" begins hitting the people responsible, the low level military action will continue. (Solution - begin killing Pakistani Generals and ISI agents - all the while denying it of course).
- Lots of our allies supported us. ROK sent over two divisions. Australia, New Zealand, the Phillipines, etc. Thailand committed their entire force in the shadows of Laos. 18 countries contributed troops and/or support for the allies in Vietnam. True our European allies didn't send much material help, but they were not asked to... the threat to Europe was the critical ground and keep in mind the US kept 300,000 troops in Europe all during the Vietnam war. At the same time, UK and Australia et. al., were fighting a low-level war against Indonesia in Sabah and Sarawak (Malaysia), lots of indirect and direct military action was taking place elsewhere, especially in Africa, and armies were still required in Korea, etc.
- Westmoreland was actually a pretty good General. The conventional aspect of the Vietnam war was handled methodically and pretty well, up to a point. When he expanded to the borders in 1967, creating the logistic network as he went, he suddenly realized that there was no strategy for winning the war except that of attrition. To Westmoreland's credit, in 1968 he proposed a strategic military solution, ... the "Korea solution" ... a fortified DMZ from the S. China Sea to the Mekong. He requested an additional 200,000 troops to carry it out, and it would have worked... The fact that the NVA reacted so violently to Lom Son 719, which was only a reconnaissance in force compared to a true attempt to cut the supply line, proves the strategic concept.
- McNamara never came to grips with the central issues of the war and the conventional military side. He and his whiz kids bought into the statistical, political polling, entire "hearts and minds" theory of warfare. The military security that must precede hearts and minds was often disregarded in favor of college sociology. The problem is sociology has never stopped an armored division.
- Re: Afghanistan, yes there has been a conspicuous failure to publicize Afghanistan and drum support for the cause.. perhaps because if Pakistan's role in killing ISAF and keeping that war going was public, the public would demand retribution from Pakistan. But the US military conventional establishment has not actually publically tabled a military-based strategy of "winning" in Afghanistan ... even when Patraous himself asked. As in Vietnam, the war has been allowed to fester in part because of military doctrine, in part because of a failure of political leadership, and in part because the military had abandoned certain capabilities (advisory, special forces) in favor of ones they understood (muscle-direct action). This is what I call a military institutional preference for the "death star" option.