Why the comparison of AirLand Battle with Blitzkrieg is flawed.

[AgentKoba37]

AirLand Battle was a doctrinal concept developed as part of the US army’s FM 100-5 Operations 1982in response to the Cold War and the challenges of the anticipated Central European clash between the large-scale mechanised conventional armies of the USA and her allies and the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries. As such, this doctrine was relatively short lived, having replaced the post-Vietnam War ‘Active Defense’ policy in 1982 but being swiftly superseded in 1993 by a post-Cold War field manual aimed more specifically at non-conventional and low-intensity conflicts. In contrast, Blitzkrieg was not doctrinal at least in any official sense, being a “German phenomenon based on the traditions and heritage of German military history”(Citino, 2004).

Although AirLand Battle shares common characteristics with Blitzkrieg, it must be stressed that the Blitzkrieg campaigns for example in Poland, France and the Soviet Union were essentially pre-emptive strikes against poorly prepared opponents. In 1982 the US army was seeking an alternative to the positional and therefore highly attritional style of warfare they had prepared for in previous field manuals, a situation similar to that of the Red Army facing the Wehrmacht after the Battle of Stalingrad. Because of this, AirLand Battle instead owes more, ironically, to the Soviet doctrinal concept of Deep Battle/Operations, with both focusing on the importance of manoeuvre, attacking in depth and immobilising the enemy.

The Soviet field regulation of 1936 summarises ‘Deep Battle’ theory as follows: “tanks, artillery, aviation, and mechanized units in large scale use provide the option of simultaneously attacking the entire depth of the enemy battle formation with the objective isolating, encircling, and destroying the enemy”. As a direct comparison, FM 100-5/1982 states that, “the AirLand Battle will be dominated by the force that retains the initiative and, with deep attack and decisive maneuver, destroys its opponent’s abilities to fight and to organize in depth”. The similarities between the two are clearly evident, both focusing on the role of operational art, the use of combined, mechanised arms and perhaps most importantly the ‘deep’ attack. The Soviet emphasis on the operational level of war emerged in response to the failures during the First World War and focused on the need for consecutive series of operations in order to prevent losing the initiative and provoking an enemy counterattack. In addition, the realisation that echeloned attacks were required in order to exploit any breakthroughs in the enemy line resulted in the formation of operational-manoeuvre groups whose task was to carry out such exploitation and carry the attack throughout the operational depth of the opposition (Kagan, 1997). Eventual Soviet application of these theories to operations on the Eastern Front in 1944-45 earned the USSR successes and a reputation for operational excellence which the Americans sought to emulate in the 1980s

http://birminghamwarstudies.wordpres...ieg-is-flawed/

[Mordoror]

To put it short
Because Blitzkrieg was never a doctrine per se in German manuals but only a post 40s victories label for propaganda purpose i.e it was never doctrinaly distributed under a manual scope

Because AirLand battle which is a doctrine is also more focused on Air part that on Land part (on the contrary to Sov operational doctrine)

Where "Blitkrieg" so called doctrine and AirLand doctrine are close to each others is that they focus on annihiliation battles whereas Sov operational doctrine focus on exploitation in the depth of the ennemy to reach strategical high value targets, even at the cost of letting behind cities or army remnants.

[Astaran]

I always and only refer to the 1939 and 1940 campaigns of the Third Reich in Poland and France/Balkan and the beginning of Barbarossa as "Blitzkrieg". It's sort of a technical term for this very specific time frame in my opinion. Today, we have modern Air-Land battles with a ton of additional technology (satellites, drones etc.) that generate a totally different quality of warfare. It's as far away from the original "Blitzkrieg", as the "Blitzkrieg" itself was from WW1 Trench Warfare.

But I get aneurysms when students start to call every fast campaigns a "Blitzkrieg". My personal favorite: The Roman campaign under Drusus in Raetia was labeled a "Blitzkrieg" by the speaker. I had to suppress the desire to stand up and choke her.

[Mordoror]

It's as far away from the original "Blitzkrieg", as the "Blitzkrieg" itself was from WW1 Trench Warfare.

Exactly : it was never refered as such back in those days but it was indeed the birth of the "blietzkrieg" concept i.e combined arm action on a small point of the front by shock troops (stosstrupen groups for the germans) in order to break up the front line and allow exploitation for encirclement and destruction of the ennemy's position/army group

That's the opposite of the operational maneuver warfare doctrine of the sovs that led to the birth of the OMGs : combined arm action with standard troops on one or several points of the front in order to form a hole that would allow deep exploitation by shock troops on the rear of the ennemy frontline, sometimes far beyond it as the aim was to seize and destroy strategical positions (factories, command centers, airfields), not the first line units (at least not immediately)

The Blitzkried is a clausewitzian way of waging the war : obtain a decisive battle in order to annihilate opponent's armies
The soviet operational maneuver doctrine is more linked to a strategical overwiew of the concept of war : destroy ennemies's vital assets (strategical force multipliers assets) and the opponent's armies would disintegrate by themselves by attrition on the first line

As such the Airland battle doctrine is more linked to the first as it is looking for a decisive victory : GW1 was the manual example of a perfectly performed AirLand battle doctrine

[Mastermind]

I have never considered the so-called "Blitzkrieg" style of warfare to be anything other than the typical and well used throughout history method of fighting where by a well supplied and drilled military force is applied with verve and constancy against a static and somewhat poorly designed defense. It is, to put it simply, nothing but surprise warfare which nearly always has a certain degree of assured initial success built into it.

In my opinion, the true and lasting contribution the Germans developed was simply taking such warfare and giving it a third dimension via inclusion of aerial artillery well coordinated with the land forces. The German fighter-bombers, used as rapid response heavy and accurate artillery by the forward land generals was innovative and very well carried out. But, the answer to that application was for the opponent to gain air superiority or at least equivalence in order to break up the air arm of the advancing columns. In so doing any fast forward intrusions are at horrible risk by well trained and led forces applying the obvious threats to the enemy long exposed flanks. This was superbly demonstrated in the Battle of the Bulge, winter of 1944-45. Although some allied generals were shocked by the Germans trying to repeat their 1940 successes with a tried and true tactic, more observant Generals, like Patton and (sigh! Yes, I must admit it- ) Montgomery saw a golden opportunity in the German audaciousness. By simply holding the shoulders of the attack solid, they were only too delighted to watch the Germans foolishly thrust their heavy forces forward so far- knowing full well, the weather would soon clear and the allied superiority in the air would help seal off the attack, and a huge defeat for the Germans was only too obvious. Although the media glorified the heroic actions of Bastogne and St. Vith, which held up the German timetable, it is easy to see why intellignt Generals on the allied side might have wished such delaying actions had not been so successful, allowing the Germans to stick their heads in the noose a bit further.

So- on this account, (sorry for the digression) we can see the lure of said AirLand Battle doctrine, it had better be against a somewhat less than prepared enemy, and not overly depended on for much more than a "over balance' move in the initial phase of a campaign. Ultimately, such tactics fall prey to the same old countermeasures if the opponent keeps a level head, has well trained and equipped forces opposing it and the overall objectives are not too grand. In short- it works, but boy, is it a risky strategy.

[Mordoror]

Thxs for your post MM
Would i dare to say that you are one of the very few US members (ex-military moreover ?) that i see not praising too much the "amazing, wonderful always working" airpower doctrine .
It is pretty rare and refreshing
I already had that kind of discussion on some other forums and it is very difficult to make people understand that the nowadays dominant part of air action may be a poisonous lure for future conflicts
As such GW1 was a success, it may very well be the doom too of western military doctrines as it killed the land operational thinking

What i see is the the airland battle doctrine (that turned slowly but surely into full airpower doctrine) has transformed itself into a modernized frankenstein version of the way we waged war during WWI : i.e perform heavy attrition on ennemy forces by artillery before puncturing the front and dispersing stunned by sheer firepower ennemy's forces i.e artillery dominates, infantry/mechanized forces clean up the remnants. We just kinda changed the artillery barrages and controled fire (ToT and combined bataillon fire) by aerial artillery

Against an intelligent ennemy that may indeed ultimately prove itself counter productive and pretty much painful.

[backpack]

Gents,
I just finished an exhaustively researched and well written book on this topic. "The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II" by John Mosier. As Mordoror says, "Blitzkrieg" was a post-war name given to a mythical set of circumstances. The only place that it occured was against forces that were either unprepared, outmatched (Poland), or in full retreat (British in 1940, Germans in 1944).

It is a long/detailed read, but I recommend it.

[Mastermind]

Gents,
I just finished an exhaustively researched and well written book on this topic. "The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II" by John Mosier. As Mordoror says, "Blitzkrieg" was a post-war name given to a mythical set of circumstances. The only place that it occured was against forces that were either unprepared, outmatched (Poland), or in full retreat (British in 1940, Germans in 1944).

It is a long/detailed read, but I recommend it.

Wow. thanks. I just ordered it. Looks like a good find. MM

[asgnr]

I just finished an exhaustively researched and well written book on this topic. "The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II" by John Mosier. As Mordoror says, "Blitzkrieg" was a post-war name given to a mythical set of circumstances. The only place that it occured was against forces that were either unprepared, outmatched (Poland), or in full retreat (British in 1940, Germans in 1944).

It is a long/detailed read, but I recommend it.

Personally I found it a nonsense like Mosier’s other books on military history. The guy’s first (and only) expertise is the history of film and poetry. He approaches military history like a journalist looking for sensational quotes to string a range of suppositions on with the most extreme conclusions.

The idea that the Poles and French (and BEF) were not prepared to fight a defensive battle is an insult. They were as extremely prepared as they could be just that they wanted a refight of the wars they had fought 20 years ago and hadn’t fully appreciated the changes to the battlefield possible with radios, aircraft and mechanized transport and tanks.

On the topic of who’s rapid operations were better: Deep Ops, Airland Battle, Blitzkrieg it is perhaps worthwhile to note who did it first and who’s post WWI experimentation everyone else (Germans, Russians and Americans) used as the basis of their thinking. The answer to this question is of course the British Army. Who applied all of the principals later called Blitzkrieg, etc in 1918 to smash the Turkish Army in the Battle of Megiddo. And then in the 1920s established the Experimental Mechanized Force which practised the very tactics that were later copied by Guderian, Tukhachevsky, De Gaulle, Patton, etc.

[Mordoror]

On the topic of who’s rapid operations were better: Deep Ops, Airland Battle, Blitzkrieg it is perhaps worthwhile to note who did it first and who’s post WWI experimentation everyone else (Germans, Russians and Americans) used as the basis of their thinking. The answer to this question is of course the British Army. Who applied all of the principals later called Blitzkrieg, etc in 1918 to smash the Turkish Army in the Battle of Megiddo. And then in the 1920s established the Experimental Mechanized Force which practised the very tactics that were later copied by Guderian, Tukhachevsky, De Gaulle, Patton, etc.

I beg to differ
The roots of "Blitzkrieg" (the modern one, we can always argue that there were Blitz like situation before) are the stosstrupen groups during WWI 1917-1918 under Ludendorf
The concept is the same : an elite spearhead that breaks a front line to allow exploitation by reserves in order to encircle and destroy opponent's forces

[asgnr]

The roots of "Blitzkrieg" (the modern one, we can always argue that there were Blitz like situation before) are the stosstrupen groups during WWI 1917-1918 under Ludendorf
The concept is the same : an elite spearhead that breaks a front line to allow exploitation by reserves in order to encircle and destroy opponent's forces

The differences between the two: Blitzkrieg and Stosstrupen are extreme. Blitzkrieg is conducted on the operational level and Stosstrupen is purely tactical. Saying they are connected is like saying a boxer’s left hook is the same as a left flanking attack.

In order to conduct an exploitable spearhead offensive on an operational level which will defeat a field army you need high levels of communications, speed and deployable firepower. Which are usually provided by radios, tanks/trucks and tactical air power. There is no way well trained foot soldiers can achieve the kind of penetrations needed to have operational effect.

One may have served as inspiration but in no way does it provide technical insight. If anything the use of Stosstrupen in the Kaiserschlact would have demonstrated the limitations of a tactical solution to the outcome of a battle. The Germans would have learned through their defeat they needed an operational solution. Something the British did through their many unsuccessful tactical innovations during the war. Culminating in the battle of Megiddo and the Experimental Mechanized Force.

[Mordoror]

The differences between the two: Blitzkrieg and Stosstrupen are extreme. Blitzkrieg is conducted on the operational level and Stosstrupen is purely tactical. Saying they are connected is like saying a boxer’s left hook is the same as a left flanking attack.

That's here where we differ (it happens on internet)
Early Stosstruppen use was tactical indeed. Late stosstrupen use was not anymore as it was theorized at the operational level
See 1918 offensive (Luddendorf one)