Originally Posted by rolist
The honor to figure in the pantheon of the greatest armor commanders of the 20th Century was given by Fort Knox Armor Museum to General Israel Tal who figures in this very exclusive gallery in company of Paton, Montgomery, Rommel.
It is questionable that neither Ariel Sharon, nor Israel Tal, who were probably the most creative generals in the IDF by the time didn't become Chief of Staff.
I believe that you, as his soldiers, had also a great faith in Sharon for his fighting spirit and the conviction that he will lead you to victory. And also for the values — like rescuing the wounded, even in the most dangerous conditions — that Sharon had his part, since its early years of the IDF, in making them basic values of the army.
Were you in a tank crew?
What you wrote is not accurate at all.
If you have taken time to read the whole thread you would have found out why. You would also have found out that formal proofs of Israeli POW executed by the Egyptian Army, during Yom Kippour War, had been collected in the presence of UN observers.
Last edited by Camera; 05-02-2011 at 04:27 PM.
There is no evidence that the Eg army ha ever executed POW. Guide me to these thread posts which prove such events. Meanwhile, I would appreciate Rolist contribution regarding the Eg POW assasinations.What you wrote is not accurate at all.
If you have taken time to read the whole thread you would have found out why. You would also have found out that formal proofs of Israeli POW executed by the Egyptian Army, during Yom Kippour War, had been collected in the presence of UN observers.
To Kobr4 :
Thank you very much for your sum up of Gamal Hammad's chapter of the Chinese farm battle.
His description of 143rd's units movements are exact, except for few details that in its sequencing of the events, indeed, as for the number of the casualties of Reshef's Brigade, which he confused with the total casualties of this brigade during the war (122 instead of 300 dead).
However, the battles in Chinese farm were, without doubt, the most difficult ones, between the two armies, during this war.
I read a lot about these events, as many Israelis wrote about it : officers, simple soldiers, and also military historians.
I maintain that the study by John J. McGrath, published in 2005, is one of the most clear. It is also interesting for his critical analysis, , although somewhat simplified in some aspects, especially for the reasons for the intelligence failure.
In what year Gamal Hammad wrote his book?
Last edited by Camera; 05-02-2011 at 07:34 PM.
I'm more concerned with Egyptian-Israeli encounters throughout the Arab-Israeli conflicts. Having said that I regard Sharon's finest achievement to be the 1967 Battle of Abu-Agheila. Aside that, I don't believe he was an exceptional commander. I believe Abraham Adan is superior; I think of him as a more 'efficient and effective' commander. Sharon seemed to excel as a propagandist though; he was frequently given to saying his opinions quite loudly and at times controversially.
You're most welcome!
Hammad published his book in 1989. And, actually, the 300 dead is the figure of casualties for Sharon's division as a whole (that's, including the Reshef and Raviv brigades as well as additional units. John J. McGrath seems to be a summary of various other sources. He seems to basically reiterate what they've said, merely including more opinions and details. If you've read the sources he cites, you'll know what I mean.
Also, what intelligence failure? Did the Israelis underestimate Egyptian strengths?
Before writing a single word on this long thread, I read all the comments that were written and all the sources they were pointing to. As the thread is very long, it took me few weeks to do it.
By doing so, I read also all YOUR comments. So it is very clear for me that from your first comment on this thread, you started publishing, without reading what was published before.
So, I invite you to look out by yourself, by reading carefully what was already published and all the related sources, what you have never done.
You will find out then that after the war, bodies of Israeli POWs were exhumed in Bar Lev line, in a zone controlled by the Egyptian, with their hands tied, and executed with a bullet in their head. Those bodies of POWs were exhumed in the presence of Egyptian and Israeli officials and UN observers. And that Israel did not take legal measures against Egypt only because the relation between the two countries started to warm, leading to the separation agreements, and Sadat peace initiative.
I can also tell you, that a good friend of mine served between October 73 and November 74 in the IDF unit in Refedim that concentrated all the bodies of the fallen. Through the UN observers, they exchanged with the Egyptians the bodies of the Egyptians dead, and received the Israeli dead. (By the way, my friend personally picked up the body of Sadat's brother, whose plane was knocked-down in Sinai. He still has in his home a piece of this plane.)
My friend told me that more than once, the dead they received from the Egyptians had their hands tied in their back !
As for Benjamin Ben Eliezer, and not Benjamin Al Azer, what you say is not true. First, the event is related to the 1956 war, and not 1967, and the documentary your are talking about is not telling anything you wrote.
For more details, check carefully this thread.
Last edited by Camera; 05-06-2011 at 05:06 AM. Reason: Correction of a date
Both had different styles.
Yes. All I'm saying is that one gave better results than the other IMO.
Yes, There was an intelligence failure, because they underestimated the Egyptian deployment.
The gap between the two Egyptian armies was discovered by Battalion 87, in October 9th. It was the recce battalion of 143rd division. In the night of October 9th-10th, the whole battalion penetrated through the gap between the two armies and joined Matzmed, without being discovered.
Its mission was double. To explore this place which was long ago prepared already as an eventual point for crossing. And also, to find out if there were any survivors of the fort, still hiding there, and rescue them. (The Egyptians took the fort, a day earlier.)
The whole battalion spent the night in Matzmed, and went back in the early morning, without being discovered by the Egyptians.
Since then, the crossing was planed at this point and the gap between the armies was continually observed. But Sharon refused to send the battalion again to observe eventual changes in the Egyptian deployment, before the beginning of the operation, a week later. He was was afraid that such an exploration may fail and the surprise effect of the planned Israeli operation will be lost.
For the same reason, he refused also to send highly trained commandoes, from specialized intelligence unit, that operated in the past inside Egypt.
The evaluation of the Egyptian deployment was made with aerial photographies, and it appears that it was not accurate.
John J. McGrath is not developing this point, attributing the intelligence failure fully to Sharon, but the rest of his critical study is very interesting.
You can download the document in this link. It is in page 63 : http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/cs..._army/day1.pdf
Last edited by Camera; 05-02-2011 at 07:39 PM.
Yes, There was an intelligence failure, because they underestimated the Egyptian deployment.
The gap between the two Egyptian armies was discovered by Battalion 87, in October 9th. It was the recce battalion of 143rd division. In the night of October 9th-10th, the whole battalion penetrated through the gap between the two armies and joined Matzmed, without being discovered.
Its mission was double. To explore this place which was long ago prepared already as an eventual point for crossing. And also, to find out if there were any survivors of the fort, still hiding there, and rescue them. (The Egyptians took the fort, a day earlier.)
The whole battalion spent the night in Matzmed, and went back in the early morning, without being discovered by the Egyptians.
Since then, the crossing was planed at this point and the gap between the armies was continually observed. But Sharon refused to send the battalion again to observe eventual changes in the Egyptian deployment, before the beginning of the operation, a week later. He was was afraid that such an exploration may fail and the surprise effect of the planned Israeli operation will be lost.
For the same reason, he refused also to send highly trained commandoes, from specialized intelligence unit, that operated in the past inside Egypt.
The evaluation of the Egyptian deployment was made with aerial photographies, and it appears that it was not accurate.
John J. McGrath is not developing this point, the attributing the intelligence failure fully to Sharon, but the rest of his critical study is very interesting.
You can download the document in this link. It is in page 63 : http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/cs..._army/day1.pdf
Yes. All I'm saying is that one gave better results than the other IMO.
The reasons for that are quite complex and are also related to the different missions they had.
But in its general scheme, the strategy for the crossing was planned during the period Sharon was the commander of the Southern front, few months before the war.
Adan was more careful. Sharon's temperament was more Patton like and he had bad relation with his superiors.
Last edited by Camera; 05-02-2011 at 08:24 PM.
There is a concept in Israeli historical thinking called "Mechdal". Here is a description from the Jewish Virtual Library.
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/...barjoseph.html
In the Israeli collective memory, the Yom Kippur War is associated mainly with the IDF’s lack of preparedness. Known by the Hebrew term Mechdal (dereliction of duty), this condition was primarily due to the failure of Military Intelligence (AMAN) to provide a high-quality warning that an attack was imminent. According to IDF doctrine in 1973, such a warning was to be given at least 48 hours before the beginning of a war – the minimal time span needed to mobilize the reservists, who then constituted approximately 80% of the IDF ground forces. In 1973, however, the warning was provided only ten hours before fighting commenced. As a result, the IDF lacked the forces needed to defend the Suez and Golan fronts and the military command was highly disorganized during the war’s first stage.
AMAN’s failure to provide the time-sensitive warning was not the result of insufficient information regarding the Arabs’ preparations or intention to launch a war. Israel’s Military Intelligence had, in fact, received substantive information about an imminent attack from key sources including King Hussein of Jordan, who had warned Prime Minister Golda Meir ten days before the war began, as well as well-placed Mossad agents in Egypt. In addition, AMAN had been closely following the accumulation of forces along the Golan and Suez Canal. Thus, there were ample warnings and indicators. Until the very last moment, however, AMAN’s senior analysts, as well as its director, Eli Zeira, continued to adhere to their belief that Egypt would avoid war so long as it did not receive aircraft capable of attacking IAF bases in Israel and surface-to-surface missiles that could deter the IAF from attacking Egypt’s rear. These conditions, were not met prior to the war and consequently, AMAN officially estimated even twenty-four hours before the fighting started that the likelihood of war was “low” (Bar-Joseph 2005, 81-186). The CIA, which relied mostly on Israeli estimates regarding the likelihood of war, erred similarly.
Only a last-minute warning by Israel’s most important intelligence source in Egypt, Ashraf Marwan, the late President Nasser’s son-in-law and a close advisor to President Sadat, prevented a complete surprise. Marwan met the chief of the Mossad, Zvi Zamir, in London sixteen hours before the onset of the war to warn him that the Arab attack would begin the next day. The warning reached Israel at 4:00 a.m., ten hours before firing commenced. The mobilization of the reserves began some five hours later, in the midst of the Yom Kippur fast and the first reserve soldiers were just arriving at their bases when the war broke out (Ibid.187-99).
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