Reply With QuoteThat has been my understanding. The IDF was caught with their pants down (so-to-speak). Gen. Sharon was the only person ready.Originally Posted by Kaplanr
Don't pay attention to Shelata, He is just a troll.
That has been my understanding. The IDF was caught with their pants down (so-to-speak). Gen. Sharon was the only person ready.
Chief of Staff "Dado" Elazar had wanted a call up around Rosh Hashana - Yom Kippur but was turned down; there'd already been a general mobilization in both May and August that year. He then pressed for a limited call up of the Air Force and some armor and was turned down.
Hollis: Yanosh Ben-Gal also had a premonition and called most of his officers, including Avigdor Kahalani, up to the Golan before any mobilization occurred. He had his C&C infrastructure in place when the Syrians attacked, he then "just" had to wait for the tank crews to get up the escarpment.
Maybe that is why the Syrians did not do as well. Most people think of the Yum Kippur/October War as being in the Sinai.
Yes, but this time I was pointing to the underestimation of the strength of the Egyptian deployment in the Chinese farm.
During the planing of Abirei Lev, Sharon did not want to send his recce battalion again, or even Sayaret Matcal, to infiltrate the Egyptian defensive lines and observe their deployment. He did not want to encounter the risk that if the Egyptians would discover such infiltration they may close the gap between the 2nd and the 3rd armies. So the strength of the Egyptian deployment along Lexicon road and in the Chinese farm was evaluated mainly by aerial photographies, by the intelligence. For some reason which remain unclear, its importance was under-estimated, and the identification of the positioning of some Egyptian units was not very accurate.
For that reason, the plan was to attack the Chinese farm from West to East with only 2 battalions of Reshef's Brigade. A third one had for mission to open Tirtour road from West to East. So the force initially allocated to the job was insufficient to accomplish it in the night of October 15th-16th.
Last edited by Camera; 05-03-2011 at 06:56 AM.
In fact, Ben Gal's 7th Brigade was not formed by reservists but by conscripts. It stationed in Sinai. Few days before the war started, the 7th was transferred to the Golan, because Northern command was upset by the massive Syrian deployment and asked for reinforcement. The 7th left its Centurions in Sinai and took possession of the Centurions of a reserve brigade that just finished a training cycle.
By the way, before the war, one of the 7th units was specially trained in towing the Roller bridge with their Centurions. Later, during the war, as the 7th was in the Nord, the reservists of 421st towed the Roller bridge with their M-48. They were not prepared for this complex job and the M-48 were less fitted for the towing than the Centurions (a question of gear block).
Yes, it's a summery but a very clear one. In some aspects, it is also one sided, especially for its critics of Sharon. But it is a study in English.
There are much more opinions and details, indeed, in the sources I know, but they are in Hebrew.
Last edited by Camera; 05-03-2011 at 05:17 AM.
I know about that intelligence failure. I was rather referring to another possible intelligence failure just before the Battle of the Chinese Farm, which Camera pointed out to.
When I read "intelligence failure" I was thinking in the bigger context.
Hey,
I am sorry to say that on the rolling bridge you got it all wrong
When the bridge was shown to the chief of staff and the other generals it was towed by a platoon of regular service who were training to do so for a few weeks on a clean surface which was prepared for that. Laskov who invented it got PRASS ISRAEL (the highest award in Israel)
The M48A3 is so much better than the Centurion (SHOT KAL) – I served with both.
Anyway – that bridge had no chance to roll during battle to the canal rough terrain jammed with burning vehicles stuck in the sand.
The idea was that the platoon tanks (11) must start and stop at the precise same time - no chance.
After 7 days of battle the drivers kept falling asleep – not in the same time – the rest is known
Most of the considerations for nominating a chief of staff are political
I knew Talik and think highly of him in many ways he was the father of the Tankies not only the Merkava
Sharon is more a devious unpredictable field commander who could come up with a maneuver that is not written in any book
Every officer at one time is a crew member I dont want to disclose my age J but in1967 I was already second in command of a battalion
I have no idea - I did not hear about that.
I can only say that the EG army and the soldiers were much better in 1973 than 1967 - much better
To Camera:
Here's the rest of Hammad's account.
At Adan's command post, Ya'iri was summarily briefed on the situation and was given his task of securing Akavish and Tirtur. Acting with a sense of urgency, Ya'iri would not wait for adequate intelligence on Egyptian defenses and began moving his brigade towards his objective at 11:30 PM, October 16. Yitzak Mordechai's battalion spearheaded the advance. The paratroopers lacked artillery observers, so it was agreed they would call for fire missions over the radio net of the 162nd Division. They were not given any armor support.
Soon, Mordechai's battalion had reached an area where Tirtur and Akavish were closest, barely two kilometers apart. At 2:45 AM, October 17, they came into contact with Abdel-Hamid's left flank battalion on Tirtur, which had to realign its dispositions to face an attack coming from the east this time. The battalion commander effective artillery fire against the paratroopers, who were also receiving heavy fire from entrenched Egyptian infantry and some ten heavy machine gun (DShK's) positions spread out along the Egyptian line. The paratrooper companies spread out, and the Israelis repeatedly tried to assault the defenses. But Egyptian fire was so heavy and that they were at best able to reach within a few meters of Egyptian positions, and soon enough most of the company and platoon commanders were dead. Israeli artillery fire was ineffective, and flanking attempts were also thwarted. When the paratroopers tried to withdraw to focus on clearing Akavish instead, they were unable to, pinned down by overwhelming Egyptian fire.
At around 3:00 AM, Adan realized that if a bridge was not in place in the few remaining hours of darkness, it would mean a whole other day would be lost without a bridge in place, keeping Matt's force on the west bank further isolated and threatened. He opted to send a recon company in half-tracks down Akavish to see if it was open. At 3:30, the company reported it had reached the Yard and that Akavish was open; the Egyptians were so preoccupied battling the paratroopers they had no eyes on Akavish. Adan called Brig. Gen. David Tamari and told him to move the pontoon sections to the canal. Tamari had bulldozers clear the road of burnt-out hulls and debris, and had the pontoon sections reach Fort Lakekan without any trouble. By 6:00 AM, engineers from Sharon's division had begun construction of the bridge.
With dawn breaking, Ya'iri felt it was impossible to overcome the defenses before his men, and requested authorization from Adan to pull out his force. Adan informed Gonen of this, who refused and only agreed to Medevac for the wounded. Bar Lev, upon arriving at Adan's command post, realized the gravity of the paratroopers' situation and agreed they should be withdrawn.
An armored battalion was tasked with extricating the paratroopers. The battalion commander could identify their whereabouts on the battlefield however, so the paratroopers popped red smoke to pinpoint their position. This backfired however, as the Egyptian battalion commander, also spotting the red smoke, called heavy and accurate artillery fire on the paratroopers. The Israeli tanks assaulted the Egyptian lines, but Sagger missiles quickly set three of them on fire. Despite the overwhelming enemy fire, and despite having remained in battle uninterrupted for nearly 14 hours, the paratroopers still remained staunchly resistant.
It was clear however that they could not withdraw in the open, and so APCs were called to collect the paratroopers and pull them out, all the while under heavy fire. At last the paratroopers and their wounded had been extricated, replaced by an armored battalion from Raviv's brigade. In their fight, they had lost 70 killed and 100 wounded. (Yes, this differs from other figures, but other sources also provide the number of 70 killed. Ya'iri himself mentioned to Dayan later on that 'We had suffered seventy casualties because we went into action too hastily, without proper intelligence on the enemy's defenses.')
Around this time, the Kishuf conference took place, ending on a positive note among Israeli commanders. It was cut short when Adan to leave to defend against the 25th Armored Brigade attacking from Third Army along the GBL. The Egyptian armored brigade was undertaking an operation, inherently flawed from the beginning, to wipe out the Israeli corridor to the canal. The brigade attacked along the east bank, and severely lacked intelligence on enemy strengths (which now included the newly acquired TOW missiles) putting it in a very inferior position. Had the brigade crossed to the west bank and attacked from there along with other Egyptian units, it could have very well destroyed or captured Matt's brigade, isolated on the west bank as it was with only a small armored force, and forcing the Israelis to abandon Abiray-Lev. In the face of protest from Shazly, the commander of Third Army, and even the brigade commander, Sadat and Ahmed Ismail Ali insisted the brigade attack take place on the east bank. Haunted by the memory of 1967 they, quite unrealistically, feared a crossing to the west bank by such a large armored force would be interpreted as a retreat and would cause a rout to ensue. Both men had it their own way, and the brigade attacked from the east bank, unsurprisingly falling into an ambush by Adan's division, and retreated after losing 65 of its tanks. (Contrary to what has been widely written, the 25th Brigade began the operation with only 75 T-62 tanks, not, as many sources claim, 96 tanks. The brigade had of course seen losses between October 6 and October 17, and additionally it had allotted an entire tank company to Kibrit East (the Botzer fortification on the GBL). Its remaining 10 tanks retreated to Kibrit after the battle. Additionally, Israeli losses were more than just four tanks that accidentally ran into a minefield)
As the second ****g of the Egyptian effort to close the Israeli corridor, the 21st Armored Division attacked southwards towards Fort Lakekan. As the only unit capable of performing the assault, the 1st Armored Brigade advanced southwards with its 53 tanks at 8:15 AM. The attack, preceded by air and artillery strikes, went well at first; the brigade was able to push back the Israeli battalion located near the Lexicon-Tirtur junction and destroyed several tanks. By 9:00 AM the Egyptian tanks had reached and occupied Fort Lakekan. However, their loss of some 20 tanks in the process, coupled with Israeli counterattacks as Adan's division turned northwards from its successful ambush, along with concerted Israeli air support, resulted in the 1st Brigade retreating. Israeli tanks were in fact able to push it considerably north, beyond their original starting positions. But Egyptian armor counterattacked, and the fierce battle continued in see-saw fashion until 9:00 PM, after the 1st Brigade had been able to push the Israelis back somewhat and occupy new positions north of their original lines. Around 5:00 PM, an attack by a mechanized battalion of the 18th Brigade against al-Galaa' failed after the Egyptians suffered heavy losses; the Israelis were now occupying the irrigation ditches the Egyptians had abandoned. The brigade was reinforced with ten tanks to assist it in holding its positions.
At this point, Brig. Gen. Hafez considered with his chief engineers the possibility of employing the old pumping stations at al-Galaa' and the Chinese Farm to flood the entire area, preventing the Israelis from moving further north and compromising their current positions. Egyptian engineers had begun to do this, but found the pumping equipment useless from years of disuse. They considered bringing up their own pumping equipment, but it was not feasible, and additional logistical problems would not allow it.
While these battles took place, the 16th Brigade had remained in constant engagement with Israeli armor since the paratroopers had withdrawn. Heavy, incessant combat for three days had taken its toll on Abdel-Hamid's men. Much equipment had been destroyed and ammunition was very scarce. The brigade was now outgunned and outnumbered to boot. After receiving permission, Abdel-Hamid finally withdrew northwards and joined the defenses of the 18th Brigade, finally opening up the Tirtur and Akavish roads to the Israelis. The battle had ended, after both sides had suffered enormous and severe losses.
And here, Hammad's account of the battle ends.
It's worth noting that the commander of the left-flank battalion of the 16th Infantry Brigade, which had repelled Reshef's final attack during the battle, then went on to fight off the Israeli paratroopers, was Muhammed Hussein Tantawi. The commander of the armored battalion which went in to extricate the paratroopers was Ehud Barak, and the battalion engaged Tantawi's infantry several times. Both men were Lieutenant-Colonels at the time, both have risen to become Ministers of Defense, and both have met each other again in that capacity. Tantawi is now also the de facto head of state of Egypt.
In short, and there's a post about in here somewhere in the beginning; Sharon was a brilliant tactical commander with very little thought given to strategic goals, and Aden was a methodical commander who took in the big picture. Sharon to Patton, Adan to Rommel or Bradley.
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