ALEXS quotesInteresting. Actually, the Situation on the Egyptian front by the end of the War was described by different commentators as follows:-Iarael and Syria were close to a peace agreement in the 90s. If it would have been signed and Syria would have gotten the Golan or parts of it, would it mean they also won the Yom Kippur war?
Jordan didn't even participate in the Yom Kippur war and it also got some territory back in the peace deal is signed with Israel. I suppose they won the 6 days war too?
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...t/1989/PSJ.htmAs a final statement, a quote from Dupuy:
If War is the employment of military force in support of political objectives,
there can be no doubt that in strategic and political terms the Arab States
and particularly Egypt -- won the War,
even though the military outcome was a stalemate
In a differnt source ( Zionist source) the following statement is recorded:-
http://www.zionism-israel.com/dic/YomKippurWar.htmIsrael had won a clear victory against Syria, conquering considerable territory beyond the cease fire lines of 1967 and advancing to within about 20 miles from Damascus. . In Sinai however, the Egyptians were still on the Israeli side of the canal, with their second army, while the Israelis had surrounded the third army and advanced toward Cairo
Till today, IDF still does not allow the full documatations of this war to be published. The outcome of many battles especially on the Egyptian front are heavily censored by the Israeli authorites.
Again, Egypt had to go to War on OCT 1973 as it was clear that the Israelies are turning down all the respectfull peace arrangements. It was clear through the various offers that were made by Sadat prior to th War, that the Israeli rulers were not willing to to withdraw to the 4th of June 67 borders. Even with full peace agreements with Egypt, the Israelies expressed thier belief that alterations should be made to the 67 border lines . The upperhand tactic that was showed by Israel during the pre-war peace negotiations left no doubt to the Egyptians that a military blow must be directed to IDF to restore Egypt wrights.
The truth of the matter is that Israel successfully fought off both Syria and Egypt simultaneously with the disadvantage of being surprised. The Egyptans can't squirm out of these basic facts.
"According to Chaim Herzog:
On June 19, 1967, the National Unity Government of Israel voted unanimously to return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria in return for peace agreements.
The Israeli decision was to be conveyed to the Arab states by the U.S. government. The U.S. was informed of the decision, but not that it was to transmit it. There is no evidence of receipt from Egypt or Syria, who thus apparently never received the offer. The decision was kept a closely guarded secret within Israeli government circles and the offer was withdrawn in October, 1967."
Apparently, not long after they informed the US, Israel felt it had made a grave mistake. Note that, at the time, Arab states had agreed to UNSCR 242, and the Israeli decision of land for peace would have fulfilled a great part of that resolution. I guess the global praise raining on Israel that David had defeated Goliath and Israel had overcome all odds against the warmongering Arabs pumped too much pride and confidence into the Israelis, who quietly overturned their decision as if it had never been. All Israel needed was a final push and it would withdraw its offer, locking on to the idea that it could maintain its dominance and occupation of foreign territory. The three no's was that final push. Between June and the September three no's were two months at least. If Israel was serious about its decision, it would have seen it through.
The 1990's peace negotiations between Israel and Syria probably failed for the same reasons. At any rate, had they succeeded, it would not have been due to the Yom Kippur War; conversely, the Camp David Accords could be directly linked to the Yom Kippur War. As for Jordan, signing a peace deal with them, which will put them out of the conflict, while Israel does not make any concessions (Jordan did not regain land), is quite logical.
If it had not been for the Yom Kippur War, the Israelis would not have changed their stance, and neither would the US. With time, the Arab cause would have simply rotted away, and the possibility of Egypt regaining its occupied territories would fade into thin air.
See Last Chance to Avoid War: Sadat's Peace Initiative of February 1973 and its Failure by Uri Bar-Joseph (http://jch.sagepub.com/cgi/content/a.../41/3/545?etoc)
See The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Arab Policies, Strategies, and Campaigns by USMC Major Michael Jordan (http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...997/Jordan.htm) jump to the part on the 1973 initiative under the Strategic Setting section (search for keyword "February 1973", third result).
1. To suggest that Israel should have followed through with its acceptance of UNSC 242 despite the Khartoum Resolution is unreasonable. The authors of the Khartoum Resolution bear responsibility for its aftermath, not Israel.
2. The terms of Sadat 1971 peace initiative are questionable. Would Israel have received peace, peaceful borders and recognition? If not - and I do not believe so - then what was Israel's incentive for withdrawal?
As for Sadat's initiatives... you do not believe so based on what? Sadat offered a comprehensive peace agreement and recognized borders between Egypt and Israel based on the pre-June 1967 international borders. Sadat's peace initiatives in 1971 and 1973 were on par with the peace agreements reached at Camp David in 1977. A peace agreement was Israel's incentive for withdrawal, but the Israelis countered and demanded retention of land, a demand they gave up on after the war.
1. I am not an expert on forum rules, but you may want to consider more formal citation of quoted work.
2. Israel's obligation under UNSC 242 after the 1967 war:
A basic review of key dates is in order:
- 6/10/67 - Six Day War comes to an end;
- 9/1/67 - Khartoum Resolution
- 11/22/67 - UNSC adopts 242
It is simply unrealistic and unreasonable to expect that Israel to execute a peace initiative within 90 days of a major national and existential crisis. At that time, Israel emerged victorious - almost miraculously - from what was feared to be terrible war, if not utter defeat. Arab states were belligerent and bellicose on 6/5/67, and that antipathy toward Israel did not suddenly vanish on 6/10/67. In the period of 6/10/67 - 9/1/67 the Arabs had not accepted 242 or the principle for land for peace as 242 was still months away from adoption. And, even if I accept the premise that they did accept the principle for land for peace (for sake of discussion), then why the Khartoum resolution? If anything, the Khartoum resolution was an affirmation of the belligerence that existed on the eve of the war.
Now, I can accept the idea that an opportunity for peace may have been squandered immediately following the cessation of hostilities. But, to state that Israel is first and foremost responsible for that lost opportunity smacks of intellectual dishonesty and selective historical review.
3. I would appreciate some links documenting exactly what Sadat offered in 1971. Frankly, it is questionable if he offered nothing more than a ceasefire (and not comprehensive peace). There is a school of thought that his offer was extremely limited, and did not even extend to official recognition of Israel.
Again, there maybe a reasonable criticism against Israel that it failed to respond to Sadat’s offer and begin negotiation. Maybe in the course of negotiation, Egypt would have offered a true peace deal, including recognition and safe and secure borders. Maybe not. At any rate. a review of why Israel did not respond to Sadat offers has to be interpreted in light of contemporary events, namely the War of Attrition and the Cold War.
Likewise, the claim that the 1971 offer was on par with 1977 is questionable until the details of the 1971 are fully examined. If Sadat did not offer recognition, the difference between the 1971 and 1977 offers is one of kind, not degree.
Just a thought, could be agree that citing Wikipedia is not exactly a good way to prove a point?
[QUOTE]The truth of the matter is that Israel successfully fought off both Syria and Egypt simultaneously with the disadvantage of being surprised.[/QUOTE]A clear missunderstanding OF IDF reservists calling strategy is recorded in this quoted post . The IDF defence strategy is based on keeping a minimum force to confront & hold positions against the attacking forces till the reservists are called. IDF professionals and conscripts could be relied upon to hold back an initial enemy attack; the reservists would then deliver the decisive counter-blow. According to this strategy, Sinai division with its Bar-lev firtifications forces & with the Air force should have stopped the Egyptian army & hold its position till the arrive of the Reservists.
’Absorption’ was to be a temporary phase, entrusted entirely to the regular forces (including the air force) and to the limited number of reserves on routine duty. The main body of the reserves would not enter the fray until they had been fully mobilized - and would be used in a series of deep-penetration and offensive armored thrusts.
So introducing "Surprise " as a factor of the Egyptian army success express unawareness of IDF confrontation startegies. The outcome of the War is related to many factors, non of them is the offensive surprise.
Last edited by shelata; 03-26-2010 at 06:55 PM.
The documented facts are that Israel proposed a partial withdrawal in exchange for peace, and that the arab league responded by a triple NO.
The technicalities may be interresting if we were talking chess, but we are talking not truth (everyone has it's own, as well as pseudo objectivity), but facts.
I'm getting tired with those "new historians" methods of including subjective feelings as a tool in their "methodology", either there are documented facts, or there aren't, and one should stick to that.