Yum Kippur War

[OrangeWolf]

One interesting discussion I had once with an old Iraqi officer from the staff college in Iraq was a "plan of action" developed by the Iraqi staff college in 1964 which basically acknowledged Israeli superiority in armour and air power and created a strategy to take advantage of the two main strategic strengths of the Arabs vs israelis. Namely, manpower and strategic depth.

The plan of action called on to the use of some second line units in the front against Israel and fighting a retreating war all the way to upper Egypt in the west and Mesopotamia in the east by having a scorched earth retreat, destroying all infrastructure usable for the israelis (mainly roads, bridges and runways).

Accordingly the weakness of the arabsr was characterised as technical as well as morale.

The technical inferiority is negated by the spread of israels smaller military over a large, very large, territory. And the morale aspect is rectified by having Israeli invaders getting into the "homeland" - namely Damascus, Cairo and Baghdad.
Thus the counterattack vs Israel then happens with a combination of surviving conventional forces of Egypt Iraq and other arab nations, as well as a massive uprising and guerilla campaign inside Israeli controlled territories.... Basically a total war scenario.

Naturally such an idea was not palatable to the Arab governments at the time who considered the israe war a "side show" rather than a serious total war. But it was an interesting and novel idea nonetheless.

Note this was developed before the advent of man pads and portable atgm ... Which certainly would have made the strategy even more effective.

But would the Israelis bite?

[sheytanelkebir]

But would the Israelis bite?

well the idea was exploiting the euphoria of israelis of victory against overwhelming odds, and realising the dream of getting to the nile and euphrates (the study of psychologies of both "sides" was a major component of this study apparently)... the unstoppable victory would thus put the israeli leadership in a position where the euphoric populace and military simply cannot be "stopped and reversed", in fact it would appear that the entire arab world completely collapsed in front of them... (which was the entire point).

that was the theory at least in this "exercise" which never came to anything in the end as the "cost" was considered to high to bear.

[GB_FXST]

well the idea was exploiting the euphoria of israelis of victory against overwhelming odds, and realising the dream of getting to the nile and euphrates (the study of psychologies of both "sides" was a major component of this study apparently)... the unstoppable victory would thus put the israeli leadership in a position where the euphoric populace and military simply cannot be "stopped and reversed", in fact it would appear that the entire arab world completely collapsed in front of them... (which was the entire point).

that was the theory at least in this "exercise" which never came to anything in the end as the "cost" was considered to high to bear.

I remember the very first time I heard the concept of an Israeli conquest of both the Nile and Euphrates was during a lecture on Arab perceptions of Israel. The lecturer presented the idea, apparently prevalent amongst some Arabs, that the blue stripes on the Israeli flag represent the Nile and Euphrates. Until then, it was a utterly unknown and foreign concept to me.

I think the idea of a "Greater Israel" stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates can be solely attributed to Arab fears and/or propaganda.

[Stormz_STA]

I think the idea of a "Greater Israel" stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates can be solely attributed to Arab fears and/or propaganda.

I heard about a concept of "The Israeli Empire" stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Scary stuff.

[sheytanelkebir]

I remember the very first time I heard the concept of an Israeli conquest of both the Nile and Euphrates was during a lecture on Arab perceptions of Israel. The lecturer presented the idea, apparently prevalent amongst some Arabs, that the blue stripes on the Israeli flag represent the Nile and Euphrates. Until then, it was a utterly unknown and foreign concept to me.

I think the idea of a "Greater Israel" stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates can be solely attributed to Arab fears and/or propaganda.

perhaps perceptions change? he was talking about psychologies in the 1960s... not in the post-camp-david reality when israel began shrinking. and it was certainly not based on the silly "10 agorot" map claims!

So I don't know, perhaps one of the reasons this plan was rejected because the governors thought that israel simply would be unwilling or unable to stretch their military that far? (the actual study was based on germany vs USSR scenario - where the USSR wins through strategic depth, and combined partisan-military action).

[tanks_alot]

perhaps perceptions change? he was talking about psychologies in the 1960s... not in the post-camp-david reality when israel began shrinking. and it was certainly not based on the silly "10 agorot" map claims!

So I don't know, perhaps one of the reasons this plan was rejected because the governors thought that israel simply would be unwilling or unable to stretch their military that far? (the actual study was based on germany vs USSR scenario - where the USSR wins through strategic depth, and combined partisan-military action).

Seems a bit odd that in 1964 the Arabs believed Israel's military is suprior in conventional warfare. after 1967, sure. but until then, the Arabs generally believed that they can push the Juice into the sea. also, doesn't the fact that Israel stoped pushing in 1967, after it reached the canal, rather proved that said doctrine has more to do with Arab grasp of Israel than actual reality?

[OrangeWolf]

Seems a bit odd that in 1964 the Arabs believed Israel's military is suprior in conventional warfare. after 1967, sure. but until then, the Arabs generally believed that they can push the Juice into the sea. also, doesn't the fact that Israel stoped pushing in 1967, after it reached the canal, rather proved that said doctrine has more to do with Arab grasp of Israel than actual reality?

Exactly what I was thinking. In fact weren't many in the IDF quite unwilling to capture all of Jordanian occupied West Bank. Anyway a lil' too off-topic I guess.

[sheytanelkebir]

Seems a bit odd that in 1964 the Arabs believed Israel's military is suprior in conventional warfare. after 1967, sure. but until then, the Arabs generally believed that they can push the Juice into the sea. also, doesn't the fact that Israel stoped pushing in 1967, after it reached the canal, rather proved that said doctrine has more to do with Arab grasp of Israel than actual reality?

"arabs" are not a generic term... the Iraqi staff college at the time was staffed exclusively with sandhurst and cranwell trained professional officers. They developed literally hundreds of different scenarios and war game plans with most of our neighbouring potential enemies. This was just one of those studies.

At the time Israel was arming heavily with modern french weapons and its performance in 1956 was considered to be very impressive (at least by SOME of the iraqi staff college).

So looking at the problem holistically, especially considering the massive societal development gap between the nations (on one side a "european" developed country, on the other 3rd world developing states). The staff college suggested this scenario to maximise the natural advantages of the arab side, minimise the advantages of the israelis and overcome one of the major obstacles of the arabs (morale for a "total war" rather than a "sideshow war").

The more interesting result from this is the rejection of the plan by the government of Iraq (I have no idea if any of the other arab states were told about this plan). It shows that, Iraq at least, considered the israel war to be a very much secondary "war" "hobby war" or "part time war" call it what you wish, opposite of the rhetorical propaganda of the time... and that certainly puts into context one of the major factors in the rapid capitulation of the arabs in all their wars with israel and relatively small casualties, the governments simply never pursued a serious total war vs israel.

[Laworkerbee]

the governments simply never pursued a serious total war vs israel.

How could they? None of the countries in the Middle East had the economies or infrastructure to be able to do so.
They still don't.

[Hollis]

^^ unbelievable, that the governments (Arabs) never pushed for a serious war. I guess those action where just love pats. Maybe Sheytanelkebir has been hitting old hukka a little to much with the happy smoke.

[tanks_alot]

"arabs" are not a generic term... the Iraqi staff college at the time was staffed exclusively with sandhurst and cranwell trained professional officers. They developed literally hundreds of different scenarios and war game plans with most of our neighbouring potential enemies. This was just one of those studies.

At the time Israel was arming heavily with modern french weapons and its performance in 1956 was considered to be very impressive (at least by SOME of the iraqi staff college).

That can be argued, as while the IDF performed relatively well in 1956, it was hardly a fair fight, with Egypt attacked by Israel and the UK and France, which at the time were still quite powerful.

And while Israel was buying French Equipment, Egypt and Jordan were buying new Soviet and British equipment. it's important to remember that the technology gap we are used to today, between Israel and most of the Arab world, did not exist back then.

So looking at the problem holistically, especially considering the massive societal development gap between the nations (on one side a "european" developed country, on the other 3rd world developing states). The staff college suggested this scenario to maximise the natural advantages of the arab side, minimise the advantages of the israelis and overcome one of the major obstacles of the arabs (morale for a "total war" rather than a "sideshow war").

My second point was that this plan, at least according to how you decribed it, was a result of the belief of those officers, that Israel's intent is to conquer as much as it can and thus use the neighboring Arab countries strategic depth in order to wear down the IDF. however, those officers assertion was based i suppose on propaganda, as we know that Israel's goals were and are not, to create some sort of greater Israeli empire. and we can look at the Six Day war and see that while obviously it was not planned by the Arab coalition, Israel was smashing it's way through the lines on all fronts and despite that, Israel stoped once it had reached it's strategic goals, instead of continuing to roll into enemy territory.

The more interesting result from this is the rejection of the plan by the government of Iraq (I have no idea if any of the other arab states were told about this plan). It shows that, Iraq at least, considered the israel war to be a very much secondary "war" "hobby war" or "part time war" call it what you wish, opposite of the rhetorical propaganda of the time... and that certainly puts into context one of the major factors in the rapid capitulation of the arabs in all their wars with israel and relatively small casualties, the governments simply never pursued a serious total war vs israel.

Iraq viewd Israel as a "secondary war", since Iraq didn't have a border with Israel, for Israel's neighbours it was a different story. i believe that the reason for the relatively low losses, was the fact that the wars were conducted between, at the time, modern and conventional armies and once you destroy such an army's ability to fight - it cannot simply switch to asymmetrical warfare.

Another issue is that Arab leaders need a boggy man to direct their subjects fear and anger to, so they won't turn on their regime and despite propaganda, i belive that the leaders were quite aware of the fact that Israel's intent was not to destroy them.

[zekas]

Rare footage of Egyptian tanks T-54/55 and T-62 during 6,october 1973 war.

[tanks_alot]

To the Egyptians:

A few years ago i was flipping through the TV channels and ended up on an Egyptian one, right in the middle of a movie about the 1973 war. since i don't speak Arabic except for a few words, i guess the plot was about some Egyptian guy who was having trouble with the village chief or something, who was trying to take the woman he loves and then he goes to the war.

I think they reenacted the whole canal crossing and that a lot of the pictures and movies are actualy from there and not from the war itself. anyway, while as a film it sucked, it was interesting to watch it. they had a huge 20 minutes scene of the whole deal and then the Egyptian guy and his unit take an Israeli outpost, destroy the counter attacking Israeli armor by throwing grenades at them. then they take an Israeli base and then some sort of Israeli commander in a tank - which was probably the ugliest actor hey could find in all of Egypt, see that he is traped through the tank sights and surrenders (of course all of the Israelis fought as dirty and cowardly as possible). after that the war is over and the Egyptian guy comes home as a hero and i'm guessing gets the girl, i didn't watch it after that.

So, anyone knows what movie i'm talking about and can provide a name?

[sheytanelkebir]

That can be argued, as while the IDF performed relatively well in 1956, it was hardly a fair fight, with Egypt attacked by Israel and the UK and France, which at the time were still quite powerful.

And while Israel was buying French Equipment, Egypt and Jordan were buying new Soviet and British equipment. it's important to remember that the technology gap we are used to today, between Israel and most of the Arab world, did not exist back then.

My second point was that this plan, at least according to how you decribed it, was a result of the belief of those officers, that Israel's intent is to conquer as much as it can and thus use the neighboring Arab countries strategic depth in order to wear down the IDF. however, those officers assertion was based i suppose on propaganda, as we know that Israel's goals were and are not, to create some sort of greater Israeli empire. and we can look at the Six Day war and see that while obviously it was not planned by the Arab coalition, Israel was smashing it's way through the lines on all fronts and despite that, Israel stoped once it had reached it's strategic goals, instead of continuing to roll into enemy territory.

Iraq viewd Israel as a "secondary war", since Iraq didn't have a border with Israel, for Israel's neighbours it was a different story. i believe that the reason for the relatively low losses, was the fact that the wars were conducted between, at the time, modern and conventional armies and once you destroy such an army's ability to fight - it cannot simply switch to asymmetrical warfare.

Another issue is that Arab leaders need a boggy man to direct their subjects fear and anger to, so they won't turn on their regime and despite propaganda, i belive that the leaders were quite aware of the fact that Israel's intent was not to destroy them.

of course after 1967 (when the arab armies DID collapse totally) and israel COULD have gone further, it didn't... of course the "bogey man" argument certainly holds true, and the very bad performance of the arab's forces in 48 and 56 convinced (at least some) that alternative methods of fighting israel (if these are pursued seriously) are needed. but of course we know since then that Israel is simply a sideshow to whip up nationalist fervour and distract from domestic problems once in a while...

needless to say the "follow on" war in 1973 was executed with much more seriousness by arabs EXACTLY because they were fighting to free parts of their own country (which certainly proves one point of the original hypothesis regarding the "morale" aspect of fighting for their own land) and also regarding the differences in the arab governments seriousness in continuing the fight for their own pieces of land vs for "palestine".

[sheytanelkebir]

^^ unbelievable, that the governments (Arabs) never pushed for a serious war. I guess those action where just love pats. Maybe Sheytanelkebir has been hitting old hukka a little to much with the happy smoke.

the only real arab attack against israel was in 1948. and it was pursued as a "foreign expedition" rather than an all out "total war" (certainly the arab countries COULD have raised much larger regular and irregular forces then, than what they did). 1956 was the franco-anglo-israeli attack on Egypt and 1967 was also an israeli "pre emptive" attack... in 1973 the syrians and egyptians kicked off the war with the limited aim of regaining their land from 1967... all in all, their "anti israel" war was never pursued very seriously, in the way, for example europeans pursued WW2, yugoslav partisans vs Germany or even the Iran Iraq war.

certainly the nationalist indoctrination, "foreign bogeyman" and propping up of the local dictatorships was always the key aim. "destroying israel" was never a serious consideration (and after 1956 not considered to be practically achievable! with the non-collapse of israel as expected in 1950-52).

I guess, this perspective may be startling for Israelis who grew up listening to arab propaganda and the series of border wars... but the israel war really was just a sideshow for the arab powers that be (yea i know the average simpletons believed in it, but that was the entire point!).