Reply With QuoteThese are from Uri Dan's book of photographs - Kippur. Which could also be subtitled - I Love General Sharon.
Chief of Staff, Lt. General David "Dado" Elazar
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Dado Elazar, Haim Bar-Lev, Arik Sharon
I see how you could be easily comparing it to a mig-21. The wings are too big and too far back to be anything else than an F-4. As for the tail, possible SAM hit. Plus it has huge engine intakes on the sides which the mig-21 does not have.Originally Posted by nu4idf
These are from Uri Dan's book of photographs - Kippur. Which could also be subtitled - I Love General Sharon.
Chief of Staff, Lt. General David "Dado" Elazar
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Dado Elazar, Haim Bar-Lev, Arik Sharon
damn great pics Kaplanr.. you can smell war only by watching them.
I think Israel was much better prepard to the war then arabs. And it seems strange why they begun this war with such poor aviation.
The color pictures are amazing,thank you for sharing.
They didn't begin with poor aviation, it was actually a better equipped air force than in 67. THe problem was a 25km SAM belt in front of the canal along with numerous ZSU AAA guns. It may have been the one Russian defensive doctrine that worked. It wasn't the Arab air forces that took its toll on the IAF. THe SAMs comprised all three ranges high, medium and low altitude; the IAF couldn't provide effective CAS until the last two weeks of the war, after ECMs arrived from the US and after the armor and infantry started rolling up SAM batteries. The one time the air force came into its own was when the Egyptian armor advanced past the SAM umbrella - on the 14th of October near the Mitla Pass.
As for the argument that a pre-emptive strike like in 67 would have changed the course of the war overlooks the SAM and AAA superiority held by the Arabs. It also overlooks that the bridging equipment was so modular that seriously damaging it was unlikely. Had a strike been successful against the Egyptian and Syrian airfields (like Moked in 67) that still leaves the SAMs intact.
If you're interested, here is the URL for a paper titles Air Operations During The 1973 Arab-Israeli War And The Implications For Marine Aviation by Major Martin Musella USMC. http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...t/1985/MML.htm
Very good info. Thanks for the link Kaplanr
I am not sure I agree.
1. In the north IDF suffered first and formost from a numerical disadvantage. Syrians were broken by the arrival of the reserve divisions, not by breaching the missile shield. If the war started with Larner and Peled mobilized and ready to roll the whole affair would be over in a day or two putting way more pressure on the Egyptians.
2. In the south pre-emptive strike would mean that the Bar-Lev Line would be fully staffed and the entire southern command on the war footing, thus preventing the canal crossing and putting egyptian infantry out of range of their missile.
Pre-emptive strike couldn't possible be worse.
Did the Egyptians get the Sinai back in the agreements made after the ceasefire?. It would seem that the Egyptian aims were partially achieved through war and diplomacy.
Modern historiography holds that Saddat never intended to advance more then a couple miles into the Sinai. His aim to to cross, entranch, inflict casualties under the SAM cover and hope it will kick-start the negotiations. Syrian defeat forced him to alter the plans.
IDF artillery in the Syrian front.
A destroyed Centurion in the Golan.
Sherman tank in the Golan.
Skyhawks(I think....) over the Golan.
Destroyed Syrian armor.
IDF forces in Sinai.
Wow... ImageShack has been really sluggish today....
7th from the bottom, Phantoms not Skyhawks.
I've already stated before that i don't know Shyt about Air Forces.... and even more so at not so modern warplanes.
Certainly couldn't have been worse. I'm distinguishing between full mobilization and an actual pre-emptive or first strike by the air force. Even before we talk about Laner and Peled, it would have been nice to have had both the Barak and 7th Brigades at full-strength.
I think a full-mobilization (which Dado wanted) would have prevented the Egyptians from crossing, certainly from consolidating the bridgeheads. I'm not sure it would have prevented a breakthrough on the olan, though they certainly wouldn't have had Raful's almost last stand at Nafekh; the Syrians wouldn't have been able to reach the ridge line overlooking the Galilee. To me the big unknown is what would have changed vis-a-vis the air force's inability to counter the SAM threat.
Ive never realized how Dado resembled Harvey Keitel... (well atleast on the photos above)
And Dayan - Yul Brinner...
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