Thanks for the info![]()
As far as I know there is no conscripts in SO. There are 135 regiment of 58th Army which is contract troops only. Not sure for 100%, but seen article about it while ago. Also VDV and GRU professionals only.
About helmets and body armor - they simply don't wear them, don't ask me why. May be because it don't save from AK bullets, but I guess it saves from shell's. In the last few days there was a couple articles in russian press about it, that officers should order their soldiers to wear body armor, as it could minimize casualties.
In SO and Abkhazia only about 12-15 thousands of Russian soldiers (2-3 days ago). And that was confirmed by US intelligence. Not much compare to 30 thousands of Georgian army and 100 thousands of reservists.
That's false. The bulk of the 58th Army is not composed of contract troops. Look at the ORBAT of the 58th. Plenty of conscripts that were deployed to SO. These include men from the 19th Motor Rifle Division, 205th Separate Moto-Rifle Brigade and 136th Guards Separate Moto-Rifle Brigade. The 135th Sep. Moto-Rifle Regiment does not have access to the armored forces evident in SO. And the bulk of the VDV deployment is in Abkhazia, where the VDV troops that destroyed Georgian military infrastructure in Poti deployed from.As far as I know there is no conscripts in SO. There are 135 regiment of 58th Army which is contract troops only. Not sure for 100%, but seen article about it while ago. Also VDV and GRU professionals only.
Also false. As I have said here - and elsewhere (this speculation was validated by US estimates) - the Georgians were not numerically inferior to the Russian forces in-theater. Between the 8th and the 9th, approximately 7-9,000 Russian forces were deployed against two brigades of the Georgian LF (6,000 troops and 60 AFVs) and a separate tank battalion (~60 AFVs). This strength (up to 9,000) was only achieved by constant reinforcement, and does not reflect the actual strength deployed against the Georgians at any given time. That is to say, there were likely fewer than 9,000 RF troops in combat with the Georgian forces at any time prior to the 10th of August. By the 12th, there were likely 12-14,000 Russian servicemen in SO, Abkhazia and Georgia. The sum of Georgia's LF is just above 30,000 troops. In terms of quantity, the disparity your post suggests didn't exist.How well trained the Georgian Army was really isn't an issue here because they were overwhelmed by Russian quantity, not necessary world beating quality
L.
You guys like to throw this around a lot, "US trained". US "trained" them for what it needed them, Iraq. The training didn't involve in the least bit anything to do with frontal militrary confrontation. It taught them how to patrol around in "peackeeping duties". So you can keep saying it all you want, it doesn't make it true. US "trains" Albanian troops too, but only for such things as Iraq duties, essencially training that has no value at all in combat.and despite all that, the well equipped, US trained georgians had more casualties, lost equipment, abandoned equipment and fled!
As for casualties, 100+ Russians plus probably a few hundred Ossetions, for 200-300 Georgian troops. I wouldn't call that stellar performance on part of the Russian army.
Georgia's army never had a chance, simply because of its size, but I susspect its melting away had more to do with politics in Tbilisi than anything else.
Hey there professor. The Russian troops involved were from various units from various regions (including "elite" units stationed further up north that were in the area for training), as well as VDV and Naval troops. The Caucas region is the most tense region, where you have Chechnya, Dagestan, Georgia and all the other things that come with it, Armenia and the rest as well as being the most tense and strategic region where Russian troops are stationed.The 58th Army never has been and never will be a first-tier formation in the Russian armed forces. Whilst some (I repeat: SOME) of these men have combat experience in Chechnya, most are, in fact, conscripts who would have little to none. The best Russian formations (those in and around the Moscow MD, the RFE etc) were not used in this conflict. The reason why the 58th still has tanks like T62s in its motor pool is simple; army military-technical organization staff did not believe the existent Caucasian threats warranted the presence of more advanced means (the most advanced T72s, T80s, T90s) or better formations (the 131st Moto-Rifle Brigade, for example, is considered a highly proficient all-professional unit, and only has elements in Abkhazia, not in S. Ossetia or Georgia).
Please use your brain when making statements like the above. Simpletons watch only face-value imagery. Analytical thinkers look deeper. Be more analytical.
Saying that their "elite" troops are around Moscow isn't saying much. Good going to have them aroung Moscow. I'd say these troops in Ossetia these days are more representative of the vast majority of the Russian Army, not those 2-3 units around Moscow for parade purposes. And these units which clearly were "prepared" and "front-line" (becuase if the Caucas isn't the front line, Moscow certain isn't) to react within 2 days of the start of conflict...went in there with ancient equipment looking like they just came out of Afghanistan, with a T-72B Model 1989 being the most modern piece of equipment available, with soldiers that barely wore the same type of unfirom (or shoes, or slippers), with the tactics about as brillient as Grozny 1995 (luckily for the Russians the Georgians were worst). Discipline seems no beter improved than Grozny 1995 either. Stealing uniforms?
T-62s aren't even the issue, because T-72Bs aren't exaclty a leap foreward from there.
The point is, the parades in Moscow seem to hardly represent the state of the Russian military, as this conflict clearly exposed. Saying their best units are in Moscow, is saying that they'r only for show because the vast majority still remains an army out of the 80s. Not just the qeuipment, but the tactics too and the soldiers look like a rag-tag bunch
And the units with T-62s are contract units. If these guys aren't "front line", then who is? Or do Russians consider as "front line" units only those that look the pritiest for parades in Moscow, but the other 95% of the army that isn't, is just "conscripts which aren't really that important to the big picture". Hmm.
Question - Two of the Soldiers in these pics have a blue band around their helmet. Are they Military Police - or is that marking indicative of something else?
Pics @ FOXNEWS
There is no official casualties of georgian army. At least I don't believe them, we talk about saakashvili. The only thing i'm sure is that there about 200 captured. And I guess far more than 200-300 georgian troops were killed.As for casualties, 100+ Russians plus probably a few hundred Ossetions, for 200-300 Georgian troops. I wouldn't call that stellar performance on part of the Russian army.
peacekeepers.
Thats marking of Peacekeeping Forces,that was presented in SO for 16 years under UN mandate - 500 georgian/500 russian/500 ossetian due to Dagomiss agreement.As well military veciles marked with blue round and words MC - "Миротворческие Силы" - "Peacekeeping Forces"
As well there are same MC presented for 15 years in Abkazia - over 2500 kontingent,but not joint,only Russian.
No - all formations involved are from the TC Military District. Of the 42nd MRD two companies of the two Chechen battalions were involved. The VDV forces (one regiment of the 76th Guards Airborne Div; the 104th) were deployed in Abkhazia (and were evident in the destruction of Georgian facilities in Poti). Then there were two battalions from the 33rd Separate Moto-Rifle Brigade. The bulk of the troops involved were from the 136th and 205th MRBs and 19th MRD. That is to say, the 58th Army. And we speak mostly of elements from each (individual regiments and battalions).The Russian troops involved were from various units from various regions (including "elite" units stationed further up north that were in the area for training), as well as VDV and Naval troops.
Chechnya is held by the 42nd MRD, not the 58th Army. There are MVD and GRU forces in place to tackle internal issues (there are four MVD divisions - the 2nd, 54th, 99th and 100th Operational Designation Divisions - and four separate brigades - the 22nd, 26th, 46th and 102nd brigades - as well as the 15th 'Scythian' OMON Regiment deployed in the NC). The 58th Army is a general purpose, second tier army primarily envisioned to handle problems in a low AFV threat environment. Lots of recon elements, plenty of artillery and enough motorized infantry to get them around.The Caucas region is the most tense region, where you have Chechnya, Dagestan, Georgia and all the other things that come with it
2-3 units? What, exactly, is your perception of the size of the Moscow MD? The 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Moto-Rifle Division is frequently cited as Russia's best unit in that category. But the Moscow MD also disposes of 20th Guards Army (2x Tank Divisions) and 22nd Army (3rd Guards Moto-Rifle Division), 27th Separate Moto-Rifle Brigade, 106th Guards Airborne Div, 98th Guards Airborne Div and very large quantities of aircraft, artillery and rocket forces.Saying that their "elite" troops are around Moscow isn't saying much. Good going to have them aroung Moscow. I'd say these troops in Ossetia these days are more representative of the vast majority of the Russian Army, not those 2-3 units around Moscow for parade purposes.
The Moscow MD by size alone is larger than most states' military institutions entire.
And, pray tell, what were the tactics of the Russians that were as 'brillient' as those used in Grozny 1995?And these units which clearly were "prepared" and "front-line" (becuase if the Caucas isn't the front line, Moscow certain isn't) to react within 2 days of the start of conflict...went in there with ancient equipment looking like they just came out of Afghanistan, with a T-72B Model 1989 being the most modern piece of equipment available, with soldiers that barely wore the same type of unfirom (or shoes, or slippers), with the tactics about as brillient as Grozny 1995 (luckily for the Russians the Georgians were worst)
I see. The 'qeuipment' is terrible, the tactics are terrible, the soldiers are rag-tag. I really don't know what that says of the Georgians, who lasted all of two days against such a rabble. Truly, it is a wonder that Russian forces are rated so highly, generally, when military professionals such as yourself are there to present us with such lucid evidence of their lack of combat worthiness.The point is, the parades in Moscow seem to hardly represent the state of the Russian military, as this conflict clearly exposed. Saying their best units are in Moscow, is saying that they'r only for show because the vast majority still remains an army out of the 80s. Not just the qeuipment, but the tactics too and the soldiers look like a rag-tag bunch
The Russians have enough T72s to outfit the current Russian army three or four times over. The usage of T62s (most likely not by the contracted 135th MRR) tells you... what? I have an answer in mind, but I am curious as to see what a person such as yourself comes up with.And the units with T-62s are contract units.
L.
Last edited by Lokos; 08-17-2008 at 03:24 AM.
If you all want this thread locked, and your accounts suspended or banned, keep on going, otherwise, post some pics of Russian Military and keep your comments to yourselves.
A Russian soldier holds a hand grenade as he rests after digging trenches in Igoeti, northwest of the capital Tbilisi, Georgia, Saturday, Aug. 16, 2008.