Falklands 25

[DeltaWhisky58]

Hearing that about the Belgrano enforces my theories about the terrible leadership which Argentine Forces had a this time. Not only had they no combat experience, but they seem to have taken little note of anything passed on by allies/suppliers who had. The Generals/Admirals were too political and far too detached from the reality of running the armed forces.

[happyslapper]

Originally Posted by ChrisBV

I don't mean to be disrespectful here, but it is my perception that Argentines are constantly trying to 'rewrite' the Falklands War history in order to make their sound defeat an easier burden to bear. This has nothing to do with Enrique, who's most valuable contributions to this discussion are highly appreciated, but to people in "the other forum" and elsewhere I've personally have come across with.

I completely agree. I'm a member of other forums, and have discussed issues (mostly political matters) about the Islands for a number of years, and this is the constant cycle. Parroted myths, and invented stories, all of which are massively disrespectful to those of all naitonalities who have suffered.

Enrique,
Firstly I hope you are well, it's been some time since this thread has had any worthwhile activity. Sam McFarlane is actually featured in a number of books related to Coventry's participation, as well as in interviews about the sinking. Nowhere does he remotely infer such a high loss, or anything other than the official. Here is a documentary/dramatisation about Coventry's role in the war, in which he is featured:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DNUnb...eature=related
...you'd think he'd be rather keen to correct the statistics!

Anyway, such ridiculous idiots on 'other forums' are best ignored.

Regards the Belgrano, I'll dig out my copy of Mike Rossiter's Sink the Belgrano to check later, but I definitely recall the naval officers quoted in the book as saying that each ship was under direct orders not to stop for if one ship was hit. 12kts is probably an endurance speed for a ship of that class and vintage, and it's also worth remembering that the task group was effectively loitering in preperation for a coordinated attack. No need for speed, which is far more likely to give you away to any nearby threats. The assessment carried out by Capt Bonzo and his command team was that they should primarily prepare to counter an air attack by Sea Harriers, and that they were a lost cause against the submarine threat.

I'll return to elaborate once I've checked a few sources.

[reydelcastillo]

Thank you all for the replies -It's very interesting -

To Mr Delta Whisky : This is something I have found out very recently and will give you clear view of the readiness :

On April the 8th , Inteligence Officers from One of the Combat Brigades to be deployed on the Islands were buying ( that book that shows the armament that each Army has - Patricks book ? ) - so we could know something from whom we were going to engage in combat -

This speeks for itself -

[welshmann]

i think the main thing is,we have NOT hidden the figures here in the Uk of the dead and wounded ETC during this conflict.As DW has said,this is a important next 2 weeks to us in the uk,so lets knock these claims on the head for now. and respect the fallen from both sides of this conflict.

[ChrisBV]

Originally Posted by DeltaWhisky58

Hearing that about the Belgrano enforces my theories about the terrible leadership which Argentine Forces had a this time. Not only had they no combat experience, but they seem to have taken little note of anything passed on by allies/suppliers who had. The Generals/Admirals were too political and far too detached from the reality of running the armed forces.

No kidding.

The people running the show were more politicians in uniform that soldiers; they lacked the vision and inclination for strategic thought required in order to deal with tactical situations and the planning and carrying out of a military campaign. To think, for example, that Admiral Anaya - who conditioned his support to Galtieri to the retaking of the 'Malvinas' - devised a plan to bomb British warships anchored in Gibraltar, some 7,000 miles away, as if such actions would have had any effect in the operations in the South Atlantic and to think he seriously considered he actually could pulls this off (and put resources into it) is beyond my comprehension.

The performance of the ARA in the Falklands campaign was appalling, to say the least. For instance, Argentina had a decent submarine force that could have caused significant damage to the Task Force had it been properly fit for duty, but the military planners chose to commit their submarines to the transport of troops and supplies (such was the case, for example, of ARA Santa Fé, whose presence did deter HMS Endurance from approaching the combat zone in the first stages of the Argentine invasion but later on served exclusively as a target for depth charges, missiles and machine gun fire) instead of sending them out to hunt British supply vessels. The British did consider the Argentine submarine force to be a very serious threat - in the Board of Inquiry report on the loss of HMS Sheffield, one can read how the concern for being attacked by submarines had an adverse effect on rescue operations; also, the Queen Elizabeth 2, carrying loads of troops, had to be diverted to South Georgia in order to keep her away from potential Argentine submarines on patrol - but the Argentines didn't use their submarines in the way they were supposed to and when they did, they achieved little or no good in favour of the Argentine war effort: their 'U209' class submarine San Luis did launch a few attacks but without results as their SST-4 torpedoes failed each and every time to hit their marks. The Argentines claim that such failures were induced by a poor maintenance routine that had inverted the polarity of the on-board gyros (LOL) and a further failure of the platform's fire control system; furthermore, the San Luis had to set sail with only 3 of her 4 diesel engines operational, because there wasn't enough time for an engine change when the war broke out so it is clear that the vessel wasn't even remotely fit for combat by the time it was deployed to the South Atlantic.

I'm surprised they weren't sunk by the British! The Argentines in other forums regard as a 'victory' the fact that the San Luis could evade the British sensors and their (alleged) counter-attacks but it was sheer luck what saved that boat and her crew from spending eternity in the bottom of the South Atlantic and nothing else.

Sadly, the ARA was apparently far more prepared to carry out the policy of persecution, incarceration, torture and murder against their fellow countrymen than to properly fight a war against a foreign adversary, I'm afraid.

[DeltaWhisky58]

Originally Posted by ChrisBV

No kidding.

The people running the show were more politicians in uniform that soldiers; they lacked the vision and inclination for strategic thought required in order to deal with tactical situations and the planning and carrying out of a military campaign. To think, for example, that Admiral Anaya - who conditioned his support to Galtieri to the retaking of the 'Malvinas' - devised a plan to bomb British warships anchored in Gibraltar, some 7,000 miles away, as if such actions would have had any effect in the operations in the South Atlantic and to think he seriously considered he actually could pulls this off (and put resources into it) is beyond my comprehension.

The performance of the ARA in the Falklands campaign was appalling, to say the least. For instance, Argentina had a decent submarine force that could have caused significant damage to the Task Force had it been properly fit for duty, but the military planners chose to commit their submarines to the transport of troops and supplies (such was the case, for example, of ARA Santa Fé, whose presence did deter HMS Endurance from approaching the combat zone in the first stages of the Argentine invasion but later on served exclusively as a target for depth charges, missiles and machine gun fire) instead of sending them out to hunt British supply vessels. The British did consider the Argentine submarine force to be a very serious threat - in the Board of Inquiry report on the loss of HMS Sheffield, one can read how the concern for being attacked by submarines had an adverse effect on rescue operations; also, the Queen Elizabeth 2, carrying loads of troops, had to be diverted to South Georgia in order to keep her away from potential Argentine submarines on patrol - but the Argentines didn't use their submarines in the way they were supposed to and when they did, they achieved little or no good in favour of the Argentine war effort: their 'U209' class submarine San Luis did launch a few attacks but without results as their SST-4 torpedoes failed each and every time to hit their marks. The Argentines claim that such failures were induced by a poor maintenance routine that had inverted the polarity of the on-board gyros (LOL) and a further failure of the platform's fire control system; furthermore, the San Luis had to set sail with only 3 of her 4 diesel engines operational, because there wasn't enough time for an engine change when the war broke out so it is clear that the vessel wasn't even remotely fit for combat by the time it was deployed to the South Atlantic.

I'm surprised they weren't sunk by the British! The Argentines in other forums regard as a 'victory' the fact that the San Luis could evade the British sensors and their (alleged) counter-attacks but it was sheer luck what saved that boat and her crew from spending eternity in the bottom of the South Atlantic and nothing else.

Sadly, the ARA was apparently far more prepared to carry out the policy of persecution, incarceration, torture and murder against their fellow countrymen than to properly fight a war against a foreign adversary, I'm afraid.

Hallelujah to that Chris, and on that note I'm off to bed

[Royal]

Originally Posted by reydelcastillo

On April the 8th , Inteligence Officers from One of the Combat Brigades to be deployed on the Islands were buying ( that book that shows the armament that each Army has - Patricks book ? ) - so we could know something from whom we were going to engage in combat

Do you mean Janes?

[reydelcastillo]

Originally Posted by Royal

Do you mean Janes?

That's the one and not Patrick

[ninja-lewis]

Originally Posted by DeltaWhisky58

Hearing that about the Belgrano enforces my theories about the terrible leadership which Argentine Forces had a this time. Not only had they no combat experience, but they seem to have taken little note of anything passed on by allies/suppliers who had. The Generals/Admirals were too political and far too detached from the reality of running the armed forces.

At a tactical level (i.e. below the political generals and admirals you mention) I'm not sure I'd agree with that. We know the ARA used its own Type 42 destroyers to prepare tactics against us (although they never got around to using them from 25 de Mayo, the knowledge may have influenced the exocet attacks). I also recall another author stating that Argentina had recently undertaken amphibious training with the UMSC, which influenced their own doctrine and their expectations of ours: they were expecting a direct assault landing because that's what the USMC did rather than opting for an unopposed landing as far from Stanley as possible with a land campaign.

So it may not necessarily be the case that they didn't listen to their allies/suppliers; they simply may not have be able to apply the information or the information was not accurate in respect of what we would do. Take for example, the loss of one the Sea Harriers to a Roland SAM near Stanley: we had the information from the suppliers and knew its capability but that didn't prevent a pilot inadvertently getting too close. You could imply from the loss that we didn't heed the information when in reality it was a simple error in spite of the information. So it would seem harsh to me to judge them in that respect.

The leadership and strategy, especially at the political level, on the other hand, were of course a whole other ball game as you rightly say.

PS didn't our officers have to resort to Janes to find out what we were about to face? We didn't even have enough maps to spare for the first Black Buck raid.

[planeman]

Originally Posted by ChrisBV

Not necessarily, she had a relatively decent anti-aircraft suite, comprised of 40mm twin anti-aircraft guns linked to a fire control radar and two Sea Cat launchers which were part of her modernisation in 1968, so perhaps she could have found more use as an anti-air platform anchored in the shallow waters off Port Stanley (safe from submarines). She was an armoured ship built for a different war, she could have taken damage from air attacks and still operate (she had a 3-inch thick solid steel upper deck and her belt armour could reach 4 inches in some places so she was very well protected compared to a modern warship).

The radar was decent but the air-defences were strictly self-defence and Sea Cat was arguably the least successful air-defence missile to see combat.

[ChrisBV]

Originally Posted by planeman

The radar was decent but the air-defences were strictly self-defence and Sea Cat was arguably the least successful air-defence missile to see combat.

Sea Cat as a 1st-generation SAM system was indeed outdated (nevertheless it was credited with one confirmed kill and some other 'probables' - possibly 6 enemy aeroplanes were shot down in situations where Sea Cat was involved); the point is, however, that perhaps ARA Belgrano could have found better use as a radar picket and AA platform rather than an ASuW cruiser or a floating target for submarines (as she lacked any sort of ASW capability).

Originally Posted by ninja-lewis

At a tactical level (i.e. below the political generals and admirals you mention) I'm not sure I'd agree with that. We know the ARA used its own Type 42 destroyers to prepare tactics against us (although they never got around to using them from 25 de Mayo, the knowledge may have influenced the exocet attacks).

Practising with their own Type 42s did help the Argentine pilots develop tactics for tackling down a modern warship, that certainly did help them carrying out their attacks against the Task Force.

Originally Posted by ninja-lewis

I also recall another author stating that Argentina had recently undertaken amphibious training with the UMSC, which influenced their own doctrine and their expectations of ours: they were expecting a direct assault landing because that's what the USMC did rather than opting for an unopposed landing as far from Stanley as possible with a land campaign.

I recall at this point the testimony of Royal Marines' Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour as shown in the documentary "Falklands: The Untold Story" when he comments why the decision of landing ground forces was made to be at San Carlos and not Stanley, saying (quote) "we don't do it that way" - that is, charging directly into battle like the Americans, I suppose - "that's not the British way of doing things".

[oldsoak]

Hardly suprising when you consider the size of the USMC and the resources at its behest.
Direct assault is a possibility if you have the resources and the ability to absorb losses - neither of which we had. This is not to say the USMC is pr*fligate - far from it, but numbers and gear give you options.

[Ordie]

http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=-38.7...z=17&t=h&hl=en

Interesting google earth image of a simulated carrier deck at Bahia Blanca, Argentina

[DeltaWhisky58]

Originally Posted by Ordie

http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=-38.7...z=17&t=h&hl=en

Interesting google earth image of a simulated carrier deck at Bahia Blanca, Argentina

Seems to be some sort of museum. I've seen carrier decks marked out on dry land before, but always on runways - that seems to be in the middle of a field, I can't see any way it could be used for anything but display.

[TOMMYJO]

Originally Posted by Ordie

http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=-38.7...z=17&t=h&hl=en

Interesting google earth image of a simulated carrier deck at Bahia Blanca, Argentina

DW is correct. It is the ARA 25 de Mayo's flight deck simulation at the Museum.

The Tracker that you can see with its wings folded.

http://www.airliners.net/photo/Argen...ker/1333022/L/

TJ