Gurkhas in the Falklands

[M1A2U2]

What is the story where the Gurkhas sneek into Stanley in the middle of the night and slit the throats of the Argentines after one of their men was excecuted?

[hist2004]

Try this link:

http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Fa...nt-William.htm

Never heard of the incident you mentioned.

Regards,
Hist2004

[Royal]

Originally Posted by hist2004

Never heard of the incident you mentioned.

Ditto.

[martinexsquaddie]

though read a book of interviews with Argie conscript woh claimed the Gurhka's were high on drugs and wearing Sony walkmans and they butchered there own injured. Though in real life I think they had only very limited combat most argies fled at rumour of they were on there way. Not that I blame then did the same thing on exercise not helped by a Gurhka officer explaining "the boys sometimes get confused between exercise and real combat unfortunatly there's just no stopping them sometimes "
I guess it was a wind up but nobody else was planning to stick around to find out :P

[DeltaWhisky58]

Originally Posted by M1A2U2

What is the story where the Gurkhas sneek into Stanley in the middle of the night and slit the throats of the Argentines after one of their men was excecuted?

Had this incident actually taken place, I very much doubt that "Johnny Gurkha" would have limited himself to slitting the Argie's throats - the Khukri is designed for lopping off heads in one clean swipe, not for lesser actions!

[Saranof]

Originally Posted by martinexsquaddie

though read a book of interviews with Argie conscript woh claimed the Gurhka's were high on drugs and wearing Sony walkmans and they butchered there own injured. Though in real life I think they had only very limited combat most argies fled at rumour of they were on there way. Not that I blame then did the same thing on exercise not helped by a Gurhka officer explaining "the boys sometimes get confused between exercise and real combat unfortunatly there's just no stopping them sometimes "
I guess it was a wind up but nobody else was planning to stick around to find out :P

Reminds me of what some our Kustjägare ("Coasthunters" , Coastal Rangers) are like. On one occasion, one of 'em emptied a live ammo mag into a tent, as retribution for some soldiers complaining of them being too rough
It didn't go down too well wtih the command, but they shut the thing down pretty soon.

[Geezah]

I'm currenlty reading a book on the Gurkhas, in one section they talked about Argentines fleeing their post because of propogande their government put out saying the Gurkhas were "drug crazed, half human cannibals"?

[csqnsas]

Urban/Military myth.

The Gurka throatslitting has been myth since WW2.

The Gurkas would creep into the jungle at night, finding any basha areas - check who was there by feeling the boots of the sleeping toms. As the Japanese had different boots to the Brits, Indians, Americans. If they were Jap boots then they would slit the throats of all but 1 or 2 men.
The survivors would wake to find the whole section etc wiped out?

Anyone been in the Jungle?- No movement at night.

Also the story of the Gurka who found his way back to India from Burma after the fall . On questioning him . How did you do it?. He replied " It was not hard I had a map"

Further investigation shows the map is of London, or in other versionsis that the map is of the London underground.

Loads of Myths I'm afraid.

WW1 - The British put out propagand to the effect that all the Germans were baby eating , Nun raping killers. Again all cr*p made up as local proof of how just the war was.

WW2. The Japanese- British myth - All Japs were cross eyed and could not shoot.

Fact, they were very good shots and the adverage Japanese soldier was more adaptable than the adverage Allied soldier in jungle warefare.

There are hundred of them

[hist2004]

The controversy over the Gurkhas deployment to the Falklands surprises me to some extent.
Their operations have been documented and the fact that Argentine conscripts had conjured up
fables about them rest solely in their imaginations. A controversy that did occur during this
time was the capture of NP (Naval Party) 8901. It had been widely reported and misreported
that the Argentine unit Buzo Tactico (Combat Divers) were responsible for the capture of the
Governors House.
I used to own a book called “This Is the SAS: a Pictorial History of the Special Air Service
Regiment by Tony Geraghty. In it is a picture of what was referred to as Unit 602 (Argentine
Commandos) shown “proning out” the Royal Marines after Governor Rex Hunt ordered them
to cease resisting. In fact the unit responsible for this was Ca Cdo Anf (Marine Commandos).
The reason I mentioned this incident because the actions this unit took after Governor Rex
Hunt ordered the Royal Marines to surrender in a sense laid the foundation for the Argentine’s
defeat in the Falklands.
The Royal Marines were unceremoniously stripped of their weapons and webbing and then forced
to lie face down in front of the Governor’s House with their hands behind their heads. They
weren’t mistreated, but the Argentine forces made a serious miscalculation by photographing
the event, and then letting the pictures out to the world press. This one action, which upon viewing
it in Great Britain, got the Brit’s “blood up” and served as catalyst for hardening Britain’s resolve
in reclaiming the Falklands.

Regards,
Hist2004

[Marsuitor]

Regarding the Gurkhas, wasn't there some photo op of them sharpening their kukris that had the Argentines all winded up? Remember seeing a b&w photo of them all taking turns on a huge sharpening wheel while having the most scary grin on their faces, after which the UK really made sure this photo ended up in Argentine media.

[Geezah]

Originally Posted by hist2004

The controversy over the Gurkhas deployment to the Falklands surprises me to some extent.
Their operations have been documented and the fact that Argentine conscripts had conjured up
fables about them rest solely in their imaginations. A controversy that did occur during this
time was the capture of NP (Naval Party) 8901. It had been widely reported and misreported
that the Argentine unit Buzo Tactico (Combat Divers) were responsible for the capture of the
Governors House.
I used to own a book called “This Is the SAS: a Pictorial History of the Special Air Service
Regiment by Tony Geraghty. In it is a picture of what was referred to as Unit 602 (Argentine
Commandos) shown “proning out” the Royal Marines after Governor Rex Hunt ordered them
to cease resisting. In fact the unit responsible for this was Ca Cdo Anf (Marine Commandos).
The reason I mentioned this incident because the actions this unit took after Governor Rex
Hunt ordered the Royal Marines to surrender in a sense laid the foundation for the Argentine’s
defeat in the Falklands.
The Royal Marines were unceremoniously stripped of their weapons and webbing and then forced
to lie face down in front of the Governor’s House with their hands behind their heads. They
weren’t mistreated, but the Argentine forces made a serious miscalculation by photographing
the event, and then letting the pictures out to the world press. This one action, which upon viewing
it in Great Britain, got the Brit’s “blood up” and served as catalyst for hardening Britain’s resolve
in reclaiming the Falklands.

Regards,
Hist2004

Royal Marines captured by Argentine Special Forces during the invasion of the Falkland Islands, 2 April 1982.

The original Royal Marine garrison pose with the Falkland Island's flag outside Government House, Port Stanley, after the Argentine surrender, June 1982.

Argentine prisoners under guard at Port Stanley, June 1982.

Royal Marines marching toward Port Stanley, June 1982.


The Argentines didn't stand a chance, Britain up until that point had been involved in some type of conflict 98yrs out of 100 and the Argentine troops were green.

[hist2004]

The Argentines didn't stand a chance, Britain up until that point had been involved in some type of conflict 98yrs out of 100 and the Argentine troops were green.

This is only my opinion, but I wouldn’t say that the Argentines “didn’t stand a chance”. The British encountered
plenty of operational difficulties (which they overcame) during the conflict. If the Argentine commanders had
begun to confront the task force (British) while it was still some distance from the Falklands, utilizing aircraft
based from the Falklands themselves; along with submarine offensive operations they could have done serious
damage to the task force. Remember, the British only had a limited number of Harriers with them and they lost most
of their helicopter transport due to Argentine air attacks hitting the ship transporting them once they were in San
Carlos. The Argentine commanders also failed to cover every possible landing site. RM & Paras landed unopposed.
Again, just talk on my part, the Brits showed the resolve needed and got the job done.

Regards,
Hist2004

[Royal]

Originally Posted by hist2004

This is only my opinion, but I wouldn’t say that the Argentines “didn’t stand a chance”. The British encountered plenty of operational difficulties (which they overcame) during the conflict.

Very true

Originally Posted by hist2004

If the Argentine commanders had begun to confront the task force (British) while it was still some distance from the Falklands, utilizing aircraft based from the Falklands themselves; along with submarine offensive operations they could have done serious
damage to the task force.

As the Santa Fe was neutralised in South Georgia and the UK had HMS Conqueror (and other submarine assets) and until MPA was built in the mid 1980's there was no airfield on the islands capable of supporting conventional fighter aircraft (the Argentines used rough strips for their C130's and Puccara's) other than the small strip at Stanley - which was put out of action by Harriers (not the Black Buck raids as was intended), I find that difficult to agree with.

Originally Posted by hist2004

Remember, the British only had a limited number of Harriers with them and they lost most of their helicopter transport due to Argentine air attacks hitting the ship transporting them once they were in San Carlos.

The Atlantic Conveyor (carrying Chinooks and Harriers) was sunk outside the TES - this certainly affected the heavy lift capacity (although one Chinook was saved and used), there remained RN SeaKings as well as RN Lynx and RM and AAC Gazelle and Scout helos.

Originally Posted by hist2004

The Argentine commanders also failed to cover every possible landing site. RM & Paras landed unopposed. Again, just talk on my part, the Brits showed the resolve needed and got the job done.

The RM and Para's did not land unopposed. The main Argentine position ovlooking Red and Blue beaches was neutralised by a party from the SBS and 148 Bty RA just prior to the landings. Several Argentines escaped and attempted to direct arty fire onto the beachead before they were captured.

[hist2004]

Some interesting points from:

CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC
the impact of air power

Dr Robert W. Duffner

The Argentines made a serious misjudgment by not using the month of April to work on extending the Port Stanley runway. If they had accomplished this vital task, a more effective defense of Port Stanley could have been achieved. A longer runway could have accepted the much needed Skyhawks and Mirages, allowing them to perform both counterair and close air support missions. Operating from a land base on the islands, Skyhawks and Mirages would not have been so severely restricted by the limitations of fuel and distance. By significantly increasing the time that they could spend in the air and with at least a three-to-one advantage in fighter aircraft, the Argentine pilots might have been able to overwhelm the small British air force by numbers alone. Also, with the critical element of staying power working in their favor, they could have engaged in more recon missions to collect more accurate intelligence on the kind and location of targets. Even more important, Argentine fighters flying out of Port Stanley would have had a better opportunity to locate and successfully attack the British fleet. This achievement might have altered the outcome of the conflict.
Air power was to have a much greater impact on the British landing at San Carlos, which began on 21 May. British soldiers secured the beaches unopposed on the ground, but the escort ships in Falkland Sound that supported the operation faced wave after wave of Argentine planes from two directions. The small Pucarás took off from Port Stanley and flew low to the ground, approaching the Royal Navy from the east. The first Pucarás bombed and badly damaged the frigate Argonaut, one of five ships that formed a forward defense line to detect aircraft coming from the Argentine mainland.
The problem of bombs that hit their targets but failed to detonate plagued the Argentines throughout the war. Some accounts estimate that nearly 80 percent of the bombs dropped on target malfunctioned because of poor wiring and delivery techniques. Releasing the bombs at very low altitudes (less than 40 feet) did not give the bombs sufficient time to arm themselves prior to impact.
Britain suffered its worst casualties from Argentine air power on 8 June, when British troops were caught in a poorly planned and badly executed operation to land soldier sat Fitzroy. Two landing ships, Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad, anchored in Fitzroy inlet (four miles from Bluff Cove) without protection from naval escort ships, offered an inviting target to the Argentine Air Force. Mirages and Skyhawks capitalized on the opportunity by dropping bombs on both ships, which were loaded with troops ready to disembark at Fitzroy. Without naval- or land-based SAMs available to provide protective firepower, the Tristram and Galahad were extremely vulnerable. As a result, more than fifty lives were lost--the highest single-day casualty figure of the war for the British.
The absence of an adequate Argentine naval force and the inferior training of the bulk of Argentine ground troops resulted in Argentina's placing a disproportionate share of combat responsibility and expectations on the Argentine Air Force. This circumstance, coupled with the Argentines' failure to extend the vitally important Port Stanley airstrip and their very limited aerial-refueling capability, directly contributed to Argentina's defeat.
British combat operations in the conflict were successful not only because of the Argentines' fundamental military weaknesses but also because of the superb leadership and highly coordinated planning efforts carried out by the Royal Navy, Army, and Air Force at all levels of command.

Regards,
Hist2004

[Royal]

Regardless of what Dr Duffner (who I presume was not there) says, I'm sure that those men who fought and died (or were captured) would dispute his claim that the landings were unopposed - as do the British official unit war diaries...

His point about the extension of the runway at Stanley would be a valid one but for two vital points; a cratered runway is no use for fast jets no matter how long it is (the runway was already being cratered by Harriers to prevent its use by C130s - an aircraft renowned for its rough take off/landing abilities). But probbaly more importantly, how would the Argentines have got enough jet fuel to Stanley to support the jets? The British had already largely prevented use of the runway by supply planes (although the racecourse was used) and do you really think a supply ship would have made it through the TES unscathed and then docked and unloaded without being hit?

A final point that just occured to me - Pebble Island. Yes Stanley airfield would have been better defended, but the UK was already prepared to sacrifice an SAS squadron in a 'suicide attack' on Stanley that was planned and not executed - they would certainly have done it in this case.